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Abstract
Research during the past decade in the area of KL-ONE style general purpose knowl-
edge representation has encountered some significant empirical and theoretical road-
blocks which seem to suggest that the problems will not be amenable to cosmetic
solutions. To a large degree these problems are a result of giving extensional seman-
tics to KL-ONE style concepts, and the widely accepted constraint that KR systems
should be sound and complete in worst case polynomial time. In a 1990 technical
report William Woods sketches the form of a significant alteration in the foundational
understanding of concepts and subsumption, along with a number of other important
suggestions. In this work we specify a KR language with a set of formal foundations
which supports many of the features that Woods advocated.
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expressivity, which was the primary deficiency identified by the NIKL/ABEL group
[8]. To a significant degree research of the late 80's has investigated the tractability
of specific constructs because those have provided clear publishable results. It is
our concern that this effort resembles the fable of looking underneath the lamppost
because that is where the light is brightest while in fact the bulk of the evidence
points towards the conclusion that the real answers are far from the neat and tidy
domain of sound, complete and efficient systems.
1.3 Wood's Proposal: Issues and Pragmatics
As mentioned earlier this work is a continuation of the work in Woods' 1990 technical
report [31]. In that report Woods advances a number of ideas for the next generation
of KL-ONE-like languages. Many of those ideas we have already touched upon through
our discussion of representational issues, although some of ideas address pragmatic
issues in the construction of KR languages that we have not yet covered. In this
section we summarize Woods' proposal, reviewing material from the previous section
as necessary.
One way to present the content of Woods' proposal, as well as to motivate it is to
detail his framework using his claims about improved performance as the road map.
Woods claims that his system provides the following features:
* An intensional foundation for conceptual structures, rather then the extensional
foundations common in languages rooted in first order logic;
* A notion of intensional or structural subsumption that is both well-defined and
computationally tractable;
* A different metric for the evaluation of tractability results;
* Quantificational tags allowing links to carry explicit quantificational informa-
tion;
* A mechanism for expressing and combining both definitional and assertional
information;
* Means for dealing with multiple equivalent descriptions of a given concept;
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* The incorporation of probabilistic information and default values within the
framework of structural subsumption; and
* Means for having concepts be simultaneously both generic and individual.
In brief, there are two key central contributions of Wood's work, the first is a
concise push away from first order logic and towards the notion of conceptual de-
scriptions and intensional subsumption; and the second is a fairly well developed
notion of quantificational tags and how they would be integrated within the frame-
work of intensional subsumption. In the following subsection we will cover the above
claims in more detail.
1.3.1 Results of Subsumption and Conceptual Descriptions
Woods advocates significant changes in both the intuitions and algorithms governing
subsumption and conceptual structures. In the next chapter we will discuss in more
detail the notion of a conceptual description, and provide the formal semantics for
intensional vs. extensional semantics. At this point we highlight several of the major
benefits resulting from these changes: tractable subsumption, capacity for multiple
definitions and partial definitions, and the ability to view concepts simultaneously as
individual and generic.
Tractable Subsumption
Although the idea of subsumption appears simple and straightforward, Woods argues
in [31] that in practice the basic notion often becomes confused or complicated. He
argues that part of the difficulty is that there are really several distinct notions of
subsumption and that the word "subsumption" has become overloaded. We now
present the notions of subsumption that Woods identified and we will revisit these
notions from a more formal perspective in the next chapter:
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would stay relatively constant after a certain complexity level is reached.
1.2.3 Definitional and Assertional Representations
The distinction between assertional and definitional information is an issue that the
KR community has long struggled with. In 1975 Woods [29] introduced the notions
of structural and assertional links, where structural links are those that are used for
setting up parts of a proposition or description while assertional links make statements
about the world. In response to later systems which were still confused about whether
representations were meant to define prototypes or to assert facts, Brachman, Fikes
and Levesque in 1983 [4] advanced a number of tenets regarding definitional and
assertional information. Doyle and Patil summarized these tenets as follows [6, p.
264]:
1. Definitions define terms.
2. Assertions use terms to state propositions.
3. Storing definitions and assertions separately clarifies the meaning of represen-
tations.
4. Optimizing definitional and assertional inferences separately maximizes the ef-
ficiency of the representation system.
5. Therefore, representation systems should restrict taxonomic classification to
terminological definitions alone.
The response to this approach, as with Brachman and Levesque's stand on soundness
and completeness, is that the goal of a clear distinction between terminological and
assertional information is a worthy one, but that the position they take is too extreme
and hinders the development of practically useful systems.
Consider the difficult experience the NIKL/ABEL group had translating the ABEL
knowledge base into NIKL due at least in part to the fact that the NIKL system
provided no mechanism for representing or reasoning about individuals. Although
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it should not be a surprise that this inability to represent instances proved to be
problematic, what did turn out to be a notable surprise was the extent to which
definitional and assertional information were revealed as being tied together. For
example the concepts of treatable and untreatable diseases seem straightforward to
define; however the information about whether a particular disease is treatable is
usually viewed as assertional. This means that the classifier would not be able to
recognize the class of treatable diseases, and following similar reasoning we can con-
clude the same about, "the concepts of solvable problems, childless persons, feasible
schedules, winnable positions, illegal acts, constitutional laws, industrial nations, and
democratic countries." [6, p. 282] Others have also noted difficulty of segregating as-
sertional and definitional information [13] and Schmolze and Mark [25] note that the
ABEL group was able to mix definitional and assertional knowledge without running
into any dire repercussions.
Another approach is presented by Alchourr6n, Gardenfors and Makinson in [1] in
which they advocate a system of epistemic entrenchment where beliefs are ordered by
the strength of the user's faith in those beliefs. Thus one can view "definitions" as
lying at the far end of this scale where for any given concept they would be the last
thing to relax in the face of an apparent contradiction. Along these lines Woods [29]
advocates a framework in which users would be able to distinguish definitions from
facts which happen to correlate with a given concept, however the classifier would
have equal access to both forms of knowledge.
1.2.4 Concepts and Extensional Meanings
The traditional way to assign meaning to concepts and roles in the KL-ONE family
has been to view them as stand-ins for the set of entities or pairs of entities that
they represent. Hence the meaning of the concept Cat is the set of all the cats in
the domain, and thus the meaning of a concept is its extension. Although this seems
like a reasonable basis for assigning meaning, there are a couple subtle problems that
arise.
The first problem is that assertions about concepts whose extension is the empty
22
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the key tasks in the efforts to design "intelligent" automated reasoning sys-
tems is that of representing a substantial body of knowledge about a given subject.
However, the issue of what is meant by the term knowledge representation is complex
since every functional application, spreadsheet, and word processing document must
contain or encode some form of knowledge. We focus on representation of knowledge
in the sense that a KR system must exhibit the following properties:
* One should be able to isolate meaningful structures or statements in the system
(this is not usually true for example of neural networks).
* These statements should unambiguously say what the world would have to be
like in order for them to be true.
* The system should be able to draw some subset of the conclusions that follow
logically from the knowledge represented.
* Ideally the representational framework should be fully general in the sense of
being able to represent knowledge from radically different domains but failing
that, if it is designed to handle a specific domain it must be able to represent
virtually all the relevant information in that domain and it should be somewhat
successful in representing knowledge from related domains.
One approach to the problem of representing knowledge is to tackle it as part of a
larger system focused on a specific task. Many early Al applications, especially expert
systems, incorporated a fair amount of human knowledge, but the mechanisms were
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often entirely ad-hoc and non-uniform and the knowledge was sometimes represented
in program parameter values whose individual semantics were at best a mystery and
potentially nonexistent, as with many neural net applications. A different approach
involves developing a general purpose domain-independent scheme to explicitly rep-
resent wide areas of knowledge. It is upon this area that our work builds.
The area of general purpose KR research began in the late 1960's with the develop-
ment of semantic networks. Although there was a significant amount of provocative
work done in this area, by the end of the 1970's there was a fairly solid consensus
that semantic network systems left much to be desired. Although the systems loosely
satisfied the definition of KR mentioned above, the semantics were still largely ad-hoc
and the meanings of numerous constructs depended solely on the intuitions of the
reader, aided only by suggestive naming conventions.
In response, during the late 1970's and the first couple years of the 1980's the
KL-ONE system was created [5, 24]. The purpose of the KL-ONE system was to pro-
vide a general-purpose domain-independent representation system within an object
or concept centered framework. The description of KL-ONE provided clear semantics
based on first order logic for concepts and subsumption. However, due to limited
resources and a number of unspecified details in the description of KL-ONE, the full
system was never implemented and it was NIKL1 (the immediate successor of KL-ONE
[10, 15, 14, 21, 25, 28]) which was much more widely distributed and had the most
significant impact on researchers' approach and opinion of this line of research.
The introduction of KL-ONE and NIKL generated considerable interest and activity
with the research community. The result of these investigations were some exciting
successes with NIKL for applications in very limited sections of natural language un-
derstanding, automatic programming and planning. However, efforts to apply NIKL
to other tasks ran into a number of substantial obstacles because of the constraints
that the NIKL system placed on expressivity. At roughly the same time that this
work was being pursued, there was a flurry of tractability research [16, 17, 18, 19, 23]
whose impact was that later KR systems became much more focused on addressing
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'New Implementation of KL-ONE.
these tractability concerns than addressing the issues raised by the users community.
There have been a number of voices advocating a different direction for KL-ONE
style research than the one pursued in the late 80's. One of the more prominent
has been William Woods, who published an article in 1990 [31] advancing several
important ideas for the reform of general purpose KR and KL-ONE style languages in
specific. The focus of this thesis involves expanding on this work principally by filling
in many of the important details left unspecified by Woods. In the remainder of this
introduction we provide some background needed to situate Woods' proposal, and
after describing his ideas in some detail we will address our intended contribution.
1.1 Overview of KL-ONE
This section provides a very brief overview of the KL-ONE system, which facilitates
creation of a broad network of "structured" concepts standing in specified relation-
ships to each other. The KL-ONE system replaces the unstructured nodes and links of
semantics networks with concepts which are related to each other through a collections
of roles and the entire system is organized in a taxonomic hierarchy of generality. Thus
concepts are defined through the roles that are attached to them and their placement
in the taxonomy.
1.1.1 Roles
Roles were intended to represent any arbitrary relation between concepts, and were
viewed as being attached to particular concepts and thus in a sense functioning as
attributes of those concepts. For example, the concept of a person could clearly have
many roles: place of birth, father, mother, spouse, children, occupation, etc. Since
the concept of a person is a generic concept the meaning of these roles would be such
that for any given instance of the person concept (i.e. for a specific person) there may
exist some instance of another concept which represents this person's child, spouse,
etc. The instances which would be the targets of such relations are called the fillers
of the roles which they satisfy.
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Although it is in fact saying something to state that for a given instance of a
concept that there might exist an instance of some other concept where a specified
relationship holds between the two concepts, in general we want to be more specific
and roles provide two mechanism for doing this. The first is through what is called
a value restriction, which allows the user to require the fillers of a given role to be
instances of a specific concept. A trivial example of this is the value restriction that
would be placed on the child role of the person concept, restricting the fillers of that
role to be people also (i.e. the offspring of humans much be human also). The second
constraint on roles is that of number restrictions which allows the user to specify the
number of fillers of a given role. Thus the father and mother roles would be required
to have exactly one filler while the spouse role could have either zero or one.
Finally, KL-ONE provides one other means for placing constraints on the fillers of
roles and that was through the use of structural conditions (also known as structural
descriptions). Structural conditions are attached like roles to a given concept and
they allow one to state that a specific relationship holds between the fillers of a given
role or between the fillers of different roles. For example in the classic AI example
of the blocks world arch, there would be a "lintel" and an "uprights" role attached
to the arch concept, both value restricted to being blocks. We would use structural
conditions to allow the statement of the constraint that the fillers of the uprights role
can not be touching and to state that the fillers of the upright role must support the
filler of the lintel role.
1.1.2 Taxonomic Links
The other key component used to represent relationships between concepts is that
of taxonomic links. The most common links in the average KL-ONE knowledge base
consist of two primary links, those linking roles and concepts which represent value
restrictions, and links between concepts which represent taxonomic links. Taxonomic
links are used to specify a subclass/superclass relationship between generic concepts.
For example, there could be a taxonomic link between the concept of human and
that of mammal indicating that humans are a kind of mammal, and similarly there
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could be a link between the concept of an animal and that of a mammal which would
encode the fact that mammals are a specific kind of animal.
As in a frame system, more specific concepts automatically inherit the properties
or roles of all the subsuming concepts. However, unlike in a frame system the roles
of the subsuming concepts are not treated as defaults in the sense that they can
not be overridden at a lower level. In general the reason for the creation of a more
specific concept is either to tighten the value or number restriction on a given role or
to specify that the new concept represents the conjunction of several concepts. For
example, we could define the concept of a bachelor by specializing the concept of a
man and requiring there to be exactly zero fillers of the spouse role. An example
of specialization through conjunction of concepts could involve the definition of the
concept of email which would be a subclass both of the concept of a letter and of the
concept of an electronic communication.
A major component of KL-ONE which manages the taxonomic links is called the
classifier. When a new concept is defined, KL-ONE uses the classifier to attempt to
determine the appropriate position of the new concept within the taxonomic hierarchy.
The most naive algorithm for doing this involves starting at the top of the hierarchy
and doing a breadth-first search to test for subsumption. One concept is determined
to subsume another concept if and only if the first concept is strictly more general
than the latter. The classification process is complete after the set of the most specific
concepts which all subsume the new concept has been found and all of concepts in the
set have been explicitly asserted to subsume the new concept unless those links are
already part of the concept definition. The nature of this set of most specific concepts
is such that no concept in the set should be subsumed by another other concept in
the set, and for any concept X in the taxonomy which is not in the set but which
subsumes the new concept, there must a concept in the set which is a specialization
of X.
Finally, KL-ONE also permits the construction of concepts with only partial defi-
nitions through what are called primitive concepts. Primitive concepts were intended
to represent what philosophers termed "natural kinds", meaning concepts such as
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"bird" or "hand" where no complete definition is feasible since it is possible to con-
tinually propose borderline cases (e.g. penguins, paws) which challenge almost any
rigid definition. For non-primitive concepts in KL-ONE a definition specifies a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions, and for primitive concepts a definition contains
only necessary conditions. Thus the classification algorithm will never place a newly
defined concept as an instance or subclass of a primitive concept, however if it explic-
itly stated in the concept definition that the new concept is an instance or subclass of
a primitive concept then it will automatically inherit all the roles that are attached
to that concept.
1.2 Representation Issues
In the development of successors to KL-ONE during the second half of the 1980's, the
discussion about how to construct such descendants was characterized by a vigor-
ous debate involving several important issues. To a large degree, these issues were,
and still are, taken to be the most important axes along which general purpose KR
languages are measured. The issues are:
Soundness: Given a set of sentences , a sentence X is logically entailed (written
rF = ) if and only if every interpretation and variable assignment that satisfies
the sentences in r also satisfies . In other words, Fr = if and only if =j
F[u] implies 1= [uv] for all interpretations I and variable assignments U, where
an interpretation maps the constant symbols in the language to elements of a
conceptualization and a variable assignment maps variables to elements of the
conceptualization. We say that an inference procedure is sound if any sentence
that can be derived from a database (i.e. F) using that procedure is logically
entailed by that database. The main manner in which this issue surfaces in KR
systems involves the discussion of whether to allow default information and the
associated inferences which are not sound.
Completeness: We say that an inference procedure is complete if and only if any
sentence that is logically entailed by a database can be derived using that pro-
cedure. Developing KR systems with sounds and complete inference procedures
is in general very difficult.
Expressivity: A definition of global expressivity is difficult to provide, so we will
instead give a relative definition by saying that a given system is more expres-
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sive than another system if it can represent everything that that system can
represent and some set of relationships that it can not. As will be discussed
in more detail shortly, questions in many languages are undecidable, and even
in relatively constrained languages, inference procedures that are sound and
complete may require exponential time for certain tasks. Thus positions on
this issue generally involve statements about what kind of expressivity is most
crucial and what form of constraints on it are acceptable.
Efficiency: By efficiency we mean the running time of the representation system on a
given task. The question of how to measure the efficiency of general purpose KR
systems is as crucial as it is contested. Part of the debate involves whether we
should be focusing on the complexity of classification or the complexity of sub-
sumption, and another part of the debate involves the question of whether the
worst case time complexity should be required to be polynomial, exponential,
or simply decidable.
Assertional Information: The issue of the how or whether to separate definitional
and assertional information has turned out to be a vexing problem for many
general KR systems. A broad spectrum of researchers have advocated a variety
of positions on this issue, ranging from forbidding any assertional information,
to allowing it to be mixed in indiscriminately with definitional information.
Extensionality: There has been considerable debate around the subject of whether
first order logic under the standard extensional interpretation of concepts and
roles is an appropriate base representation for KL-ONE-like languages.
A large number of papers and systems have addressed the issues above, but we will
discuss only a few of them. We will begin our discussion with a seminal paper [29] that
William Woods published in 1975 in response to mainstream of semantic networks
research. This paper argued for the development of a clear set of explicit semantics
in future systems and strongly pushed people to provide a better characterization of
the constructs and inferences supplied by their systems. This philosophy was fur-
ther extended and reached its most extreme in a highly influential paper published
in 1984 by Ronald Brachman and Hector Levesque [11]. In this paper Brachman
and Levesque essentially argued that KR systems should provide sound and complete
inference systems, and that such systems should have at worst polynomial time com-
plexity in the worst case. After some time many researchers came to the conclusion
that the constraints that Brachman and Levesque had specified, although well mo-
tivated, were placing a crushing burden on the developers of KL-ONE-like systems if
17
they aspired to be at all useful. In 1989, Doyle and Patil published a lengthy re-
buttal [6] to Brachman and Levesque's original paper in which they argued for more
expressivity, a relaxation of the emphasis on completeness, and advanced the notion
of "rational" management of inference tools. Much of this work was based in the
experience of a group at MIT which attempted to represent the ABEL knowledge base
[20] in NIKL and identified some important expressivity demands that NIKL could
not satisfy. Finally, in 1990 William Woods [31] published a technical report which
provided the outline of a system which was had at its foundation a series of positions
on the above issues which departed notable from Brachman and Levesque's proposal
in an effort to provide for a more expressive and therefore more practically useful KR
systems.
We will now catalogue the positions that the above players have taken on the
representation issues that we have discussed above:
1.2.1 Sound and Complete Inference
The debate surrounding the value of sound and complete inference procedures, and
specifically complete inference procedures has in many ways had the most significant
impact on this area. Brachman and Levesque advocated that all inference procedures
for KL-ONE-like languages should be sound, meaning that a false conclusion can never
be drawn, and also complete. What they meant by complete was that the system
should be able to determine "efficiently" whether a given proposition is entailed by
the information in the current knowledge base. More specifically, the system needs
to be able to recognize equivalent definitions despite different phrasings or syntactic
constructions. For example, the system would be expected to discover whether P=NP
provided that the concepts of the problems in P and problems in NP could both be
fully represented.
In [12, p. 79] Levesque and Brachman motivate this demand for completeness by
invoking the goal of a shared understanding which means that the system understand
what the knowledge means to user. To a large degree this is based on Smith's [26]
argument that the system need not be aware, "in any mysterious way of the inter-
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pretation of its structures and their connection to the world; but for us to call it
knowledge-based, we have to be able to understand its behavior as if it believed these
propositions."
In contrast Doyle and Patil argue that this demand that definitions be fully un-
derstood by the classifier before they can be used at all is way too strong. They
argue that it is possible to share understandings of meanings even if those meanings
are not 100% complete. Doyle and Patil draw a parallel to the common distinction
between "knowing" and "understanding", and note that there is a wide gulf between
these two terms. As many science teachers are well aware, it is possible for a student
to "know" facts or formulas, but to still not be able to understand them. Thus a
more reasonable demand would be that the user and the representation system have
shared knowledge but not necessarily a shared understanding.
On the soundness issue, both Woods and Doyle and Patil advocate the inclusion
of default information, and thus unsound inference into the framework of a general
KR system. Although, the KR community had previously viewed the areas of default
reasoning and structural subsumption as being orthogonal if not contradictory, the
integration of these two approaches is now an area of active investigation.
1.2.2 Tractability Analysis
Shortly after the development of the NIKL system there were a flurry of tractability
results which showed that subsumption in even moderately expressive systems is of
exponential complexity in the worst case when it is even decidable. In their paper
Brachman and Levesque presented a simple example of a language that implemented a
very limited subset of FOL, and they demonstrated how the addition of a fairly simple
construct caused the subsumption procedure to go from being computable in O(n2 )
time to being undecidable. Brachman and Levesque urged the research community
to focus its energies on mapping out the boundary between intractable and tractable
subsets of FOL and especially to, "discover the crossover points where small changes in
a language change its computational character completely."[11, p. 67]. This question
of analyzing the different sets of FOL and determining the crossover points proved to
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be a tantalizingly crisp problem description which received a significant amount of
communities' attention during the 1980's.
Brachman and Levesque's argument that the proper metric for evaluating trac-
tability results was the worst-case analysis was motivated by the existence of some
critical applications for which an unacceptable worst case behavior would make the
system unusable. Although they admit the practical importance of the average case
scenario over the worst case analysis, they observe that there had been very little
success in formally characterizing average case behavior and that it would be, "ir-
responsible" for computer scientists to be "providing general inferential service if all
that we can say about it is that by and large it will probably work satisfactorily."
Although they never argue explicitly for it, it is clear that acceptable behavior meant
that the complexity should be some small polynomial.
Doyle and Patil take issue with this strong position and argue that there are very
few standard artificial intelligence applications in which a failure on a routine task has
horrible consequences. In addition they observe that in real applications tolerance for
the occasional late or missing answer is quite common, and that the appropriate model
in which to view an inference mechanism is one in which the progress of the reasoner is
periodically reviewed and potentially aborted by some form of metareasoning system.
Furthermore, although it may be difficult to clearly characterize the mathematics of
the average case they argue that as computer scientists we should be able to use,
without embarrassment, summaries of real-world practical experience in estimates of
average running times.
Lastly, Woods in [31] takes issue with the other component of previous tractability
research, namely that these results have addressed the question of complexity in
terms of the complexity of the subsumption rather than in terms of the complexity
of classification. He argues that in most application the size of an individual concept
description is bounded by some reasonably small quantity, and thus determining
subsumption between any two concepts can be viewed for most practical purposes
as a constant time operation. Thus it is the cost of classification which comes to
dominate as the knowledge base grows, rather than the cost of subsumption which
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set (e.g. unicorns, prime numbers less than 1, and confirmed cases of the transmission
of AIDS through casual contact), assertions involving those concepts sometimes have
no semantic content. For example the statement "all unicorns drive trucks" is vacu-
ously true if there are no unicorns in the domain to quantify over. The other problem
is that although two concepts which have the same extension by definition have the
same meaning, there are an abundance of examples where this violates our intuition.
For example the concepts of morning star and the evening star are equated and even
more egregious is that so would the concept of a unicorn and the concept of a con-
firmed case of the transmission of AIDS through casual contact. Although knowing
that two concepts have the same extension may be a valuable piece of information,
we do not want it to be the dominant relationship linking the two concepts and we
certainly want to be able to continue to distinguish the two entities (something which
none of the KL-ONE descendants allow you to do).
Finally, it is worth noting that the weighty demands of completeness, that defi-
nitions be recognized as equivalent regardless of different phrasings or syntactic con-
structions, is due to the extensional nature of subsumption. Woods postulated in [31]
that there are several distinct notions of subsumption and that the common usage
of the word has become overloaded. He argues that in most of the KL-ONE family
the concept of extensional subsumption has been used this leads to unrealistic goals
of completeness (e.g. proving P=NP). However, he also states that it is possible to
formalize a less strict version of subsumption (intensional subsumption), which allows
for the goals of soundness and completeness in polynomial time.
1.2.5 Real KR Expressivity Needs
Lastly, in this section we outline some of the expressivity needs that have been iden-
tified by some of the broader research efforts that used NIKL. Unfortunately, there
have been very few research efforts to apply KL-ONE-like technologies to complex real
world problems. The two principal efforts involved one lead by Haimowitz, Patil and
Szolovits [8] and the other by Smoliar and Swartout [27]. Both these projects found
the language restrictions in NIKL to present very serious obstacles to the development
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of useful knowledge bases. In [8] Haimowitz describes the experience of trying to
translate the preexisting medical knowledge of ABEL [20], a program for the diagnosis
of acid-base and electrolyte disorders, into NIKL. The following were some of the key
short-comings of the NIKL system encountered in that effort:
* No assertional component. This prevented the creation of instances of a given
concept, and forced all statements made about generic concepts to be defini-
tional rather than assertional.
* Haimowitz et al. claimed that NIKL was unable to represent several key rela-
tionships including the part-whole, containment and other spatial relationships,
and causation. Although, Schmolze and Mark latter showed [25, pp. 64-66] that
it is possible to represent the part-whole relationship in NIKL, their solution ad-
mittedly does not address the complaint that the part-whole representation
should be assertional rather than terminological. They also concede that their
representation is potentially cumbersome and unintuitive.
* An unrealistic requirement that all concepts have a complete list of necessary
and sufficient conditions in order not to be treated as primitive concepts and
thus essentially ignored by the classifier.
* No ability to reason with numeric intervals, sequences, sets, and temporally
varying quantities.
* No capacity for multiple definitions (i.e. multiple sets of sufficiency conditions
for a given concept, the satisfaction of any one of which signals the satisfaction
of the concept), and no ability to provide multiple names (i.e. synonyms) for a
given concept.
* A counterintuitive if not incorrect implementation of statements of disjunction
and set exhaustion.
Although some of these issues have been dealt with in latter descendants of NIKL,
largely there has been little work within this family of languages towards increased
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Extensional Subsumption: This means that any instance of the subsumed concept
must be an instance of the subsuming concept in the model-theoretic sense.2
Another way to state this is that the extension of the subsuming concept is a
superset of the extension of the subsumed concept.3
Axiomatic Subsumption: A more general concept is asserted to subsume a more
specific concept as a direct result of an axiom of the knowledge base. For
example the interval (at-least 5) subsumes the interval (at-least 6).
Recorded Subsumption: Involves the case where a more general concept is explic-
itly recorded to subsume a more specific structure either through a direct link
or through the transitive closure of such link.
Structural Subsumption: A concept would structurally subsume another concept
if it is determined to be more general than the subsumed concept as the result
of some formally specified subsumption criterion applied to the structures of the
descriptions. The algorithm for determining structural subsumption essentially
rests on the ground set of axiomatic subsumption relations. The key difference
between structural and axiomatic subsumption is that axiomatic subsumption
governs only subsumption between concept components where structural sub-
sumption combines these axioms and their relations to each other to determine
subsumption between complex concepts.
All of the KL-ONE family have subscribed to the notion of extensional subsumption
in large part because it is both mathematically and intuitively very clear. However as
we have discussed already there are some significant drawbacks to this interpretation.
For example, determining whether the extension of one concept contains the extension
of another concept is often undecidable not to mention non-polynomial, and simply
because two concepts have the same extension does not mean that they should be
equated. In putting forward his notion of structural subsumption Woods does not
propose a notably different algorithm for computing subsumption, rather he proposes
a different lens through which to see concepts and subsumption.
At the heart of the idea of intensional or structural subsumption is the intuition
that a concept should subsume another concept only if this relation can be derived
from inspection of the "syntax" or "structure" of the concept and that a more general
2 By a model theory we refer back to the functions U and I from section 1.2 which map symbols
in the representation language to elements in the conceptualization.
3In this presentation we merge Woods' concept of "deduced subsumption" and "extensional
subsumption".
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deductive system would be charged with drawing more domain dependent inferences.
Thus for example while the concept of a polygon with three sides would extensionally
subsume the concept of a polygon with three angles, there is no direct structural
relationship that would allow this inference to be drawn. However, a structural sub-
sumption procedure would determine that the concept of a polygon with at least
three sides would subsume the concept of a polygon with exactly three sides.
Thus as Wood's states [31], "if subsumption is defined by a structural relationship
rather than a model-theoretic criterion, it can be defined to have a tractable sub-
sumption computation - i.e. one can choose a structural subsumption relationship
with a tractable computation as the definition."
Multiple and Partial Definitions
The KL-ONE system allowed neither multiple definitions of a concept, nor the ability
to allow for a partially defined concept. However, both of these issues were revealed
as being crucial issues for medical representation through the work of the NIKL/ABEL
group. Often a concept may have more than one set of sufficient conditions for
example the term "acidemia" may be defined as decreased pH, or similarly as an
increase in the hydrogen ion concentration [7]. Ideally we would like the system to be
able to record these multiple definitions and to recognize a new concept as satisfying
the defined concept if any one of its definitions is satisfied.
Partial definitions in KL-ONE were excluded because the system required a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for any concept definition. However, within the
field of medicine as well as other domains, the state of human knowledge is quite
incomplete and specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for every concept, or
even most concepts is impossible. In KL-ONE and NIKL any concept for which it was
not possible to encode a set of necessary and sufficient conditions was marked as
primitive and thus essentially ignored by the classifier.
Woods suggests that in order to determine if concept A subsumes concept B you
first find the conjunction of the necessary conditions attached to B and then query
whether any one of the sufficiency sets attached to A is satisfied by the conjunctions
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of B's necessary conditions. Effectively this allows for multiple definitions since more
than one sufficiency set can be given, and it allows for partial definitions since it
is possible to specify either only necessary or only sufficient conditions for a given
concept.
Individual Concepts
In keeping with the intensional view of concepts, Woods argues that there should
no longer be a distinction between generic and individual concepts, or rather that it
should be possible to view a concept simultaneously as both generic and individual.
Hence both traditional "individuals" (e.g. Ronald-Reagan) and "generic concepts"
(e.g. government-official) would be represented using conceptual descriptions, and
it would be possible for any concept to be considered an instance of any other concept.
An example of where this would be useful involves the concept of a particular doctor,
Louis-Pasteur which can be an instance of the concept of a doctor and that concept
in turn could be an instance of the concept of a medical-professional.
1.3.2 Quantificational Tags
Woods in a personal communication described his system of quantificational tags as
the most important contribution of his technical report. Woods claims that much of
the early confusion in the semantic networks community had revolved around relying
on the informal semantics of the names of the nodes and links. For example consider
the triple, (doctor works-in hospital). The English translation of this sentence is
that doctors work in hospitals, or more formally that Vx E doctor, 3y E hospital
such that (x works-in y). However, it is easy for such a statement to have hidden
semantics, for example do all doctors work in hospitals? Is a person still a doctor if
s/he does not work in a hospital? Is the place where a doctor works automatically a
hospital, and is a building still a hospital if no doctors work there?
Although few would debate the sentence, "doctors work in hospitals", when you
pin down the semantics as specified above many of the logical consequences provide
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answers to questions we have mentioned which are undesirable. The moral is that if
certain important distinctions are not made in the representation, many unintended
consequences will result. To bring these distinctions to the fore Woods proposed
a system of quantification tags which he conceived of as relational operators. For
example the operator AA could be applied to a relation to state that every instance
of a given class stands in a specified relation to every instance of another class (e.g.
(republican ([AA] voted-for) republican-candidate) would assert that every republican
voted for every republican candidate), and the tag EE denotes that there exists some
member of the first class who stands in the specified relation with at least one member
of the second class (e.g. (democrat ([EE] voted-for) democratic-candidate) means that
some democrat voted for some democratic candidate).
1.3.3 Assertional vs. Definitional vs. Defeasible Values
As discussed earlier, the distinction between assertional and definitional information
has been problematic since the early days of semantic nets. In addition, the capacity
to record defeasible values has been at the core of many frame-based reasoning sys-
tems, and is clearly crucial for a significant number of applications. Originally, in the
days of semantic nets no distinction was made between assertional and definitionally
information and then in much later systems such as KRYPTON the segregation was
strictly enforced. In this system we follow the results of the NIKL/ABEL group which
found the strong need to mix definitional and assertional information and that mixing
them did not cause major negative consequences.
Woods' advocates allowing the three different kinds of knowledge to be mixed in
the sense that the classifier would have equal access to all three, however he also
contends that it is important to clearly distinguish which information belongs to
which camp.
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1.4 This Thesis
Unfortunately Woods' technical report provides only a sketch of a system which
provides the features he discusses. Although some ideas are developed more fully
than others, there are a quite a number of gaps between Woods' proposal and a
usable system. This thesis is an effort to bridge those gaps, and although we also
leave a number of issues unresolved we attempt to do so in such a way that the
core elements of a functional system are in place and that future work can be seen as
extensions of this work rather than as a reworking of the foundations. In summary the
focus of this work involves providing mathematical semantics for Woods' notions of
concepts and intensionality in addition to transplanting his notion of quantificational
tags into a more complete framework. The follow subsections mirror the previous
section, and for each point we will describe to what extent we address the issue.
1.4.1 Intensional Subsumption
In the previous section we presented Woods' notion of structural subsumption which
shifted away from determining subsumption by evaluating the subset inclusion of
the extension of concepts and towards a notion of subsumption based solely on the
syntactic structure of the concepts. Thus the details of exactly how the structural
subsumption algorithm operates becomes increasingly important. Although Woods
discusses how structural subsumption should work for a variety of constructs, and
although the algorithm for the remaining constructs is not complex, we complete
Woods' language definition and specify the subsumption relationship.
1.4.2 Individual Concepts
Woods advocates a radically different perspective on the issue of generic versus in-
dividual concepts. This switch necessitates a fundamental shift in the semantics of
concepts since many KL-ONE systems' semantics have at their core the distinction
between concepts and individuals, where individuals are the elements of the model
domain and generic concepts represent sets of individuals. Woods does not address
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the issue of how the semantics of concepts should be changed, although this thesis
provide some further guidance.
1.4.3 Quantificational Tags
In this work we leave the underpinnings of Woods' system of tags largely untouched.
Instead of having the tags function as relational operators however, we make the
tags required components in certain constructs in the language. In addition we have
modified the syntax to increase readability. Some of the ways that the above state-
ment might be reconstructed in our language is by stating ((every doctor) works-in
(some hospital)) and ((some doctor) works-in (every hospital)), or ((every doctor)
works-in (only hospitals)). Clearly some of these statements are not true, but the
advantage of our systems is that it first allows for the distinctions to be made and
secondly, in most cases either the intuitive semantics and the formal semantics are
both correct or they are both incorrect.
1.4.4 Flavors of Information
Finally, although Woods discusses at some length the importance and difference be-
tween assertional, definitional, and defeasible information, he does not discuss how,
or at what point the information would be treated differently and we do not address
this issue either. It seems that the most obvious use would be for doing very simple
resolution of contradictions between statements. The only difference between this
work and Woods' is that we propose a somewhat different marking scheme for distin-
guishing the different kinds of knowledge in an attempt to improve the clarity of the
system.
1.5 Plan of this thesis
In this chapter we presented an overview of this work and outlined the history of the
research upon which our KR language is built. We have presented a list of claims that
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Woods had made about the benefits of his framework, and we have discussed each of
these claims in turn and explained how this work has addressed those points. In the
remainder of this thesis we provide the intuitive, semantic, and syntactic details of
the language.
Chapter 2 describes in detail the syntax the constructs in the language. We will
begin with some examples of knowledge represented in the language to provide the
reader with a feel of how the entire system operates before plunging into the details
of individual constructs.
In the next chapter we present the core contribution of our system, namely the
semantic foundations. We provide precise semantics for Woods' somewhat under-
specified notion of conceptual descriptions and intentional subsumption, and with
situate this with respect to traditional extensional semantics and subsumption. We
also detail the meaning of constructs in the language, and we present the rules which
govern which subsumption relationships are deducible. We will prove that our infer-
ence relation is sound with respect to the semantics and we will postulate that it is
also complete.
In the final chapter, we will review Woods' claims and reflect upon how the previ-
ous chapters have addressed those claims. In addition, in the discussion of each claim
we will talk about the remaining work that needs to be done to fully substantiate the
claim. Lastly, we will close with a discussion of the possible future directions of our
work.
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Chapter 2
Language Syntax
2.1 Preliminary Distinctions
In this chapter we present the syntax and informal semantics of our language. Because
of the high degree of mutual recursion of terms in the language we wish at the start
to make some clarifying distinctions. The first is the distinction between operations
which modify the knowledge base(KB), and expressions which are used to describe the
entries in the KB. We also examine the relationship between descriptions, concepts
and modifiers, and lastly present some basic examples in order to provide a better
sense of the use of the language.
2.1.1 Expressions vs. Commands
Although in this thesis we refer to a knowledge representation language and that is
indeed where the bulk of the research effort is. What we are really describing is a
KR system, the distinction being that a language is centered around "expressions",
the construction of concepts, and their interrelations, while a KR system includes all
this in addition to a mechanism to store and manage knowledge communicated via
the language. In most KR systems, the operations on the KB simply act as database
operations, manipulating the elements without regard to the kind of data represented.
In our system, some of the commands/operations carry semantic weight and it is those
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commands that are the focus of our final section. Although from a practical point of
view other commands which allow the user to search and display the knowledge base
are of high importance, since they are essentially peripheral to the representational
issues which are our focus, we leave their enumeration for future work.
2.1.2 Concepts vs. Modifiers
Earlier we introduced the notion of a conceptual description as the key building block
of the representation system. We now further refine that notion by discussing several
different "subtypes" of conceptual descriptions. While most of these categories are
straightforward, the distinction between these two particular categories, concepts and
modifiers, merits some additional explanation.
Concepts are used to represent those things which are most naturally reasoned
with as individuals or classes. For example, Ronald Reagan, the set of all Labrador
retrievers, and the citizens of India would all be perfectly reasonable concepts. By
contrast, we use modifiers to represent those things which are most naturally reasoned
with as predicates. Examples of modifiers could include such items as having blond
hair, eating fatty foods, being pregnant, or being sunburned. A modifier would be
either true or false of given description. Modifiers thus correspond to functions while
concepts represent sets.
One can of course identify these two notions through the standard math con-
struction of the characteristic function. Hence they are identical from that view, and
indeed our semantics for these two constructs will also be identical. However, we still
wish to distinguish these concepts at some level since it seems that a large component
of naturalness has been given up in previous KL-ONE-style systems by forcing people
to represent everything either as one or the other. For example, it is rare to hear
a physician reasoning explicitly about the set of people whose blood sodium level is
above 150meq/L (forcing a function into a set), and similarly it would be unnatural
to reason with a predicate for doctorness (forcing a set into a function). It is also
worth noting that there are clearly some entities which can be comfortably viewed
either as concepts(sets) or modifiers(functions), or both (e.g. "solid" means either a
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solid object or the quality of being solid). Our intent is not to imply that everything
can be clearly identified as a concept or a modifier, but to avoid the requirement of
shoehorning all things into just one of these forms. Although there is more to be said
about the importance of this distinction, we will revisit this topic later in the context
of the medical knowledge represented so far.
2.2 Overview and Examples
In table 2.1 we show an overview of the constructs of the language, and in the following
we present a few examples to provide a basic feel for this syntax. In the statements
below it is helpful to keep in mind that dcl stands for declare, def for define, typ
for typically, qty for quantity, and restr for restriction. Note that the convention we
follow in presenting statements in the language is that concept names are represented
in bold (e.g. people), reserved words are represented in san-serif (e.g. constrain), and
the names of relations are in italics (e.g. have-disease). We follow LISP conventions
of identifying symbols and numbers, so the typecase of the language is irrelevant.
Ex. 1 Magic Johnson is HIV+.
(dcl Magic-Johnson instance-of HIV-positive)
Ex. 2 The kidney is a kind of internal organ.
(def kidney kind-of internal-organ)
Ex. 3 Every person needs every vitamin.
(dcl (every person) needs (every vitamin))
Ex. 4 Every drug is taken by some patient.
(dcl (every drug) (inverse takes) (some patient))
Ex. 5 Only people with HIV are Larry's female sexual partners.
(dcl Larry (constrain sexual-partner female) (only person-with-HIV))
Ex. 6 A person with a fever is a person with temperature over 99F.
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Descriptions <unpaired-description>
(<unpaired-description>,)unpaired-descri
Interval (<numeric-interval>,<units>)
Unpaired Concept <name>
Descriptions <built-in-concept>
(<logical-op> <concept>+)
(RESTR <concept> <modifier>* {with <stmt>})
Modifiers (REL <relation> <quantified-descrip>
{(label <name>)})
(PRED <name>)
Relation <name>
<built-in-relation>
(<relation-op> <relation> {<concept>})
Statement (<quantified-description>
[<relation> <quantified-description>]+)
(<logical-op> <stmt>)
Numeric <num>
Intervals ( [<numeric-rel-op> <num>] +)
Quantified <description>
Descriptions (<tag> <description>)
(<numeric-tag> <interval>)
Commands Assertions (DEF <stmt>)
(DCL <stt>)
(TYP <stmt>)
(NAME <name> <description>)
Table 2.1: Overview of syntax of language.
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(dcl (restr person (have-disease (a fever))) same-as
(restr person (temperature (qty ((> 99),Degree-Fahrenheit)))))
As should be clear from the above, the format of the average entry to the KR system is
of the form of two descriptions with their attached quantificational information (quan-
tifiers apply left to right), the relation that holds between them, and an instruction
at the beginning indicating how the information should be interpreted.
2.3 Descriptions
Descriptions represent the core of this system and the constructs listed in this section
represent the top level "expressions" in the language.
<description>
= <unpaired-description>
I (<unpaired-description,unpaired-description>)
<unpaired-description>
= <concept>
I <modifier>
I <relation>
I <interval>
I <statement>
I <s-expression>
Note that we draw a distinction between descriptions and unpaired descriptions be-
cause we do not want to inject the additional complexity of having the elements of
ordered pairs of descriptions themselves be ordered pairs. The raison d'tre for or-
dered pairs as descriptions is to represent intervals and to provide "instances" for
relations. For example the statement (Robert-Kennedy brother John-Kennedy)
and the statement ((Robert-Kennedy,John-Kennedy) instance-of brother) would
have exactly the same semantics.
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2.3.1 Statements and Quantification
After descriptions, the next most important construct in the language is the state-
ment. A statement represents a proposition which can be either true or false, and a
simple statement consists of an infix binary relation and two quantified descriptions.
A compound statement combines statements with the usual boolean operators.
<stmt> = <simple-stmt>
I <compound-stmt>
<compound-stmt>
= (OR <stmt>*)
I (AND <stmt>*)
I (NOT <stmt>)
<simple-stmt> = (<non-numeric-quantified-description>
[<relation> <quantified-description>]+)
<non-numeric-quantified-description>
= <description>
(EVERY <description>)
(A <description>)
(SOME <description>)
(ONE <description>)
(NO <description>)
(ONLY <description>)
<quantified-description>
= <description>
(EVERY <description>)
(A <description>)
(SOME <description>)
(ONE <description>)
(NO <description>)
(ONLY <description>)
(NUM <interval>)
(QTY <interval>)
The reason for providing the option to have multiple occurrences of (<relation>
<description>) in simple statements is to allow for multiple statements to be made
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about a single entity without having to restate the entity name or description multiple
times. An example statement would be the following:
(Bill-Clinton hair-color silver
eye-color blue
place-of-birth Hope-Arkansas
.... )
Every simple statement asserts a relationship between two objects, similar to a
predicate calculus statement which asserts a relationship between two variables, where
the two variables are bound by quantifiers. In our system the quantified concept serves
as a means to introduce these quantifiers. Note also that quantified descriptions
are not descriptions in their own right and thus have no meaning when used by
themselves (just like the expression "only AIDS-patients" has an undefined meaning
when used out of context). Quantified concepts serve only to shape the semantics of
the statement or modifier in which they are used.
The quantifiers every and some correspond to the logic quantifiers V and 3, thus
for example the statement ((every man) loves (some woman)) means that for each
man there exists at least one woman whom he loves. The quantifier one is equivalent
to - that is, it means that there will be only one filler of the specified class for
that relation. No means that no such object can fill the relation, and only means
that every object that fills the relation must be of the specified type. The tag a
is provided exclusively to increase readability and has exactly the same meaning as
some. Finally, num and qty provide for the use of a range of values, e.g. ((every Bill-
Clinton) close-friends (num ((from 2 to 5),fillers)) says that the number of "fillers"
of the close-friends relation with Bill Clinton is between two and five, inclusive, we
will discuss the construction of intervals shortly. Similarly, (every truck) weighs (qty
((from .5 to 5),tons)) expresses a constraint on the weight of any truck. Num would
not be appropriate here because each truck has only one weight.
Although the use of statements to make assertions is fairly obvious, the use of
statements as "descriptions" is less clear. However, if one views a statement as
describing a truth value (in this case either true or false) then clearly it is possible.
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The costs and power of having statements be able to be descriptions are not clear
at this point, however the benefits of maintaining a uniform building block or core
element are apparent.
Finally, note that we have explicitly disallowed numeric tags from being used in
the first quantified description in a statement. Although there are some cases where
the use of a numeric tag in the first position would make sense (i.e. 5 billion people
is the population of the globe, or 100 MIT professors require 2.5 administrators) it
is usually possible to rephrase these statements by eliminating the numeric tag from
the first position. Furthermore, many expressions which use a numeric tag in the
first position are either meaningless or their semantics would be very cumbersome to
describe in a general way.
2.3.2 Concepts
As noted previously modifiers and concepts are two key sub-types of descriptions.
The structure of a concept is as follows:
<concept>
= <name>
I <built-in-concept>
I (AND <concept>+)
I (OR <concept>+)
I (NOT <concept>)
I (RESTR <concept> <modifier>* {with <stmt>})
<built-in-concept> = TOP-CONCEPT I TRUE I FALSE
This syntax outlines the basic concept-building operations and the main way to link
concepts and modifiers. As can be surmised, the above operators allow for con-
junction, disjunction, and negation of concepts. The restr essentially restricts a given
concept to only those instances which satisfy the constraints detailed by the modifiers
and the statement. For example,
42
(restr fatal-illness (rel illness-locus kidneys)
(rel risk-population
(restr men (rel age (greater-than 50)))))
This concept represents the description of a fatal illness of the kidneys for which the
major risk group is men over the age of 50.
We also include in the language several built-in concept. The concept top-
concept represents the most general concept in the hierarchy and the concepts true
and false are descriptions of truth values which we shall use in manipulating the
value of statements. At some point we expect to add concepts from the LISP type
hierarchy like string and number.
2.3.3 Modifiers
<modifier>
I (REL <relation> <quantified-description> {(label <name>)})
I (PRED <concept>)
Modifiers can be of exactly one of two forms. The first option is that it consists of
a relation and a quantified concept. The descriptions which satisfy the modifier are
those which stand in the specified relation with the quantified concept. For example,
the modifier (rel takes (a math-course)) can be viewed as a predicate which is true
only of descriptions of entities which are taking at least one math class. The concept
(restr student (rel takes (every math-course))) describes students who are taking
every math class. The other format a modifier can take begins with the reserved word
pred and then usually a name, and is used to convert a concept into a predicate or
modifier. For example the modifier (pred red-haired) would be a description of all
red haired entities.
Modifiers also allow for the ability to add a label so that it is possible to refer to
the fillers of a given relation in the statement which may appear at the end of a restr
clause. In fact the purpose of this optional statement is to assert constraints that
must hold between certain fillers of a given concept. For example:
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(restr student (rel favorite-professor (one Person) (label L1))
(rel taking (some class) (label L2))
with ((one L1) teaches (some L2)))
This concept describes students whose favorite professor is teaching some class
that s/he is taking.
2.3.4 Relations
We next consider relations, which besides being concepts in their own right, have a
special place within simple statements. At present there are six ways to refer to a
relation: by name, by the name of a pre-defined built-in relation, or by one of four
relation-forming operators:
<relation>
= <name>
(RELATION <name>)
<built-in-relation>
(INVERSE <relation>)
(ALL <relation>)
(CHAIN <relation>*)
(CONSTRAIN <relation> <concept>)
The operator inverse forms an inverse relation: (x (inverse R) y) holds whenever
(y R x) holds. The all operator is used to get at the set of fillers of a relation.
For example, the fillers of the parent relation for a person will be people, but the
unique filler of the (all parent) relation will be a set of people (which ordinarily has
cardinality 2). The chain operator is used to compose relations; the relation (chain
brother parent) means uncle. The constrain operator refers to those fillers of a relation
that happen to be of a particular type. For example, (constrain sibling female) has
the same meaning as the sister relation.
<built-in-relation>
= RELATION
I SAME-AS
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I SPECIALIZES
I KIND-OF
I SUBSUMES
I SATISFIES
I INSTANCE-OF
The list of built-in relations defined above is bound to grow but for now most of
the predefined relations involve subsumption. The relation, relation is the top-level
relation which subsumes all other relations. The relations kind-of and instance-of
were touched on in the introduction and will receive a more detailed treatment in the
chapters on semantics. The relation satisfies is identical in meaning to the instance-of
relation although it is intended to be used to state that a given concept satisfies a
certain modifier. Similarly, the specializes relation is identical to the kind-of relation
except that it is intended to be used with concepts while kind-of is intended to be used
with modifiers. The subsumes relation is also identical to the kind-of and specializes
relation except that it is intended to maximally general and can be used between
any pair of descriptions. The statement (A same-as B) is an abbreviated way of
stating (A kind-of B) and (B kind-of A). Note that this is equivalent to asserting
a mutual subsumption relationship, which causes most KL-ONE-like systems to view
the concepts as identical. However we wish to maintain a distinction between mutual
subsumption and identity, and this will be discussed further in the next chapter.
2.3.5 Quantities: Numbers, Intervals
Numbers are represented in our system through the use of descriptions which we call
intervals.
<interval> = (<numeric-interval>,<units>)
<numeric-interval> = ([<numeric-rel-op> <num>]+)
<numeric-rel-op>
-< I> I= I>==
I less-than I more-than I exactly I at-least I at-most
from Ito
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<units> = <unpaired-description>
<num> = <bounded precision floating point number in LISP format>
As described above, intervals can come in one of two forms, the first we call a numeric
interval and it describes a range of rational numbers specifying whether or not the
endpoints are included. The second form of an interval is simply a numeric interval
with a units designation and we represent that as an ordered pair with the numeric
interval as the first entry, and with an unpaired description as the second. For ex-
ample, ((at-least 1 less-than 10),liters) refers to the interval which is the intersection
of the numbers greater than or equal to 1, and those strictly less than 10. A single
number with a unit specification is also considered to be an numeric interval and
hence the intervals (5,pints), ((exactly 5),pints) and ((at-most 5 at-least 5),pints) all
mean the same thing.
2.4 Commands
Up to this point we have focused solely on the structure of the language and have
not discussed how to change the current knowledge base which the system is acting
upon. We now describe the high level commands which change the knowledge base.
The basic set is as follows:
<command> = (DEF <stmt>)
I (DCL <stmt>)
I (TYP <stit>)
I (NAME <name> <description>)
These commands have the effect of entering statements into the knowledge base. The
operators def, dcl, and typ stand for "define", "declare", and "typically" respectively,
and essentially they provide the user with a crude qualitative way of identifying the
strength of their belief in a given statement. The name command allows user to assign
a name to given description. One form of command which is clearly missing from this
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list is query operations which prompt the system to provide the user with information.
However, since query statements are somewhat implementation dependent and not
conceptually difficult we leave that section of the language unspecified in this thesis.
2.5 Examples
This section gives some more complicated examples of the use of the language to state
facts and make definitions:
Ex. 7 Every patient is treated by some doctor.
(def ((every patient) treated-by (some doctor)))
If you wanted to say that every patient is treated by the same doctor as every other
patient you would have to perform skolemization (e.g. ((every patient) treated-by
Dr-Spock)).
Ex. 8 Patients are typically treated by a single doctor.
(typ ((every patient) treated-by (one doctor)))
Ex. 9 Only doctors prescribe drugs.
(dcl (every drug) (inverse prescribe) (only doctors))
In these and later examples we allow the plural and singular forms of words to repre-
sent the same concept. Hence in this example we use "doctors" in order to increase
readability when it should really be the concept, "doctor" that would be in that slot.
In the text of the knowledge base used by an implementation, we would either have
to use only the singular or only the plural form to refer for example to the description
of a doctor, or explicitly state using the name command, that "doctor" and "doctors"
really represent the same concept.
Ex. 10 John's mother's sister is color blind.
(dcl John (chain mother sister) (pred color-blind))
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Ex. 11 John is a person with a weight of 140 pounds, six feet tall, and who takes an
anti-depressant.
(dcl John instance-of
(restr student (rel weight (num (140,pounds)))
(rel height (qty (6,feet)))
(rel takes (some anti-depressant))))
Ex. 12 An arch is an artifact with 3 parts: a lintel and two uprights (which are all
blocks), and where the uprights support the lintel and there is space between them.
(name arch
(restr artifact (rel parts (num (3,top-concept))
(rel (constrain parts (restr block (pred lintel)))
(num (1,top-concept)) (label top))
(rel (constrain parts (restr block (pred upright))
(num (2,top-concept)) (label support)))
with (and ((every support) supports (one top))
((some support) not-touching (some support)))))
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Chapter 3
Language Semantics
In this chapter we first introduce the notion of intensional semantics and intensional
subsumption by reviewing the traditional semantics given to KL-ONE-like languages
and identifying where we depart. Given that we build on the syntax which was out-
lined in the last chapter and we provide formal semantics for each of those constructs,
and an axiomatic inference system for subsumption. We prove that the inference sys-
tem is sound with respect to our semantics and we conjecture completeness with
respect to questions of subsumption.
3.1 Intensional Semantics
Woods [31] proposed replacing the traditional extensional view of concepts and sub-
sumption with intensional interpretations. Unfortunately, Woods did not make these
semantical proposals precise, and in this section we present a formal semantic frame-
work intended to capture the distinctions we believe Woods advocated.
3.1.1 Interpretations of Concepts and Roles
Standard treatments of the semantics of KL-ONE-like languages build on the usual
notions of logic and model theory, viewing concepts as unary predicates and roles as
binary predicates, and interpreting concepts as sets and roles as binary relations over
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the domain of discourse. More formally, these treatments presume:
* A set E of entities that constitutes the universe of discourse;
* A set C of concepts to represent classes of entities, and a disjoint set R of roles
or relations to represent connections between the concepts in C;
* A meaning assignment function Me : C U R -+ 2 E U 2 ExE .
Normally we think of the function e as being the union of two more specific functions,
/c · C - 2E which translates a concept into the set of entities in E of which it is
true, and p : R -- 2 ExE which translates a role into the pairs of entities in E which
satisfy the role. We will call Le an extensional meaning function because it maps
every concept and role to its denotation.
3.1.2 Subsumption
We say a concept cl subsumes another concept c2 with respect to He if and only if the
extension of cl includes the extension of c2 in /e, that is iff c2) C u(cl). We write this
relation as He l= (c1 subsumes c2). We say that cl subsumes c2 without qualification
iff cl subsumes c2 with respect to every He, and we write this as = (c1 subsumes c2).
We can thus view (c1 subsumes C2) as being an abbreviation for Vx, c1(x) - c2(x).
Thus the concept of a mammal, under the ordinary interpretation, would subsume the
concept of a primate which in turn would subsume the concept of a human since the
set of human beings is a subset of the set of primates, which is certainly a subset of
the set of mammals. The corresponding subsumption relationship for roles is written
,e j= (r subsumes r2), which is true iff e(r 2 ) C e(rl). As above we can view
(r1 subsumes r2) as an abbreviation for Vx, y, ri(x, y) -+ r2 (x, y). For example the
relation brother would be subsumed by the relation sibling which in turn would be
subsumed by the relation relative because any two individuals who are brothers must
be siblings and thus also relatives. Combining the two notions ideas gives us a form
of subsumption that we will refer to as extensional subsumption since it is determined
completely by the extensions of the various concepts and roles.
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Although extensional subsumption has its advantages we are interested in other
notions of subsumption for the following three reasons. First is that since extensional
subsumption is equivalent to logical implication, it is undecidable for even moder-
ately expressive languages. For example a system seeking to classify concepts by
using extensional subsumption would have to determine whether P=NP, if those two
complexity classes could even be represented. The second problem is that even when a
subsumption question is decidable, it is not necessarily decidable within a reasonable
amount of time. Lastly, implication is too broad in the sense that we often want the
system to distinguish concepts even when they have the same extension, e.g. humans
and featherless bipeds.
3.1.3 A Subsumption Spectrum
In an effort to clarify the alternatives we define several different notions of subsump-
tion, and these views of subsumption constitute a somewhat revised picture of Woods'
notions of subsumption as discussed in the previous chapter. The basic idea presented
by Woods is to replace a semantic definition of subsumption with an axiomatic one,
with subsumption judgments made by checking deriviability of a statement about
subsumption.
In order to make this notion more formal we need to presume the existence of
a representation language L. This language would consist of all the expressions of
the kind detailed in the previous chapter for constructing concepts/descriptions and
stating their interrelations, and it would also have to be able to make statements of
subsumption which would be either true or false given a particular meaning function
and a notion of subsumption. Obvious candidates for L include languages such as
first order logic (using implication to state subsumption) or that used for KL-ONE.
Given a language L we view a knowledge base, KB, as consisting of a collection of
sentences in L. We say that a given meaning function e satisfies a KB with respect
to subsumption if for any statement of the form (cl subsumes C2) E KB, the meaning
function entails that relationship, i.e. pe = (cl subsumes c2). In addition we say that
a knowledge base entails a given subsumption relationship, i.e. KB = (cl subsumes
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c2), if and only if all meaning functions which satisfy KB also entail the relationship
(cl subsumes C2 ).
We now detail the following notions of subsumption:
Recorded Subsumption: In this version of subsumption, a concept is considered
to subsume another concept if and only if that relation is explicitly stated. Thus
KB = (cl subsumes c2) iff (cl subsumes c2 ) E KB.
Transitive Subsumption: This notion differs from the above only in that it in-
volves the transitive closure of explicitly stated subsumption relations. Hence
KB = (c subsumes c') if and only if there exist concepts cl,... , c such that
cl = c, cn = c', and (ci subsumes ci+l) E KB for all i, 1 < i < n.
Deductive Subsumption: Deductive subsumption defines an inference relation I
on the language L which is sound with respect to =. This inference relation is
built upon a set of inference axioms such as, for example, Vcl, c2 p(cl, c2) -* (cl
subsumes c2 ). Thus in this version of subsumption one concept cl subsumes
another concept c2 if and only if KB - (cl subsumes c2).
For most non-trivial representation languages and knowledge bases the above notions
of subsumption span the range of computational difficulty, with recorded subsump-
tion being trivial and deductive subsumption, like extensional subsumption, being
intractable. If the relation - is complete with respect to = then deductive subsump-
tion is equivalent to extensional subsumption, and most KL-ONE languages seem to
implement extensional subsumption by means of deductive subsumption. Further,
depending on our selection of inference relation, recorded and transitive subsumption
can also be viewed as special cases of deductive subsumption.
The focus of our effort is to find some form of deductive subsumption which locates
a piece of middle ground between the boundaries of triviality and undecidability. We
could simply allow the - relation to be incomplete with respect to =, but effective use
of a KR system (or any system) ordinarily requires a relatively clear notion of what
inferences the system can and can not draw, and formally characterizing the nature of
incomplete deducibility relations is in general a very difficult problem. We instead seek
to avoid this difficulty by defining another sense of subsumption, called intensional
subsumption, which specifies a non-traditional entailment relation = for which the
corresponding sound and complete inference relation I- is more easily computable.
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3.1.4 Intensional Subsumption
The aim of intensional subsumption is that one concept should intensionally subsume
another concept if and only if it is "obvious" from the structure or syntax of the
concept that one is more specific than the other. For example one wants to be able
to infer purely from the syntactic structure of the concepts cl and (and cl c2 ) and
some basic notion of the keyword and, that the concept cl is more general than, and
thus subsumes the concept (and cl c2 ). In contrast, the concept of a polygon with
three angles and the concept of a polygon with three sides should not be determined
to subsume one and other since it is not obvious from the structure of the concepts
alone but requires some knowledge about the relationship between the number of
sides and the number of angles in a given polygon. Hence the task of our semantics
is to provide a reasonable formal distinction between these extremes.
The central theoretical idea which undergirds the semantics of intensional sub-
sumption is a shift in the universe of discourse away from arbitrary entities to a
simpler domain, the set of conceptual descriptions, which we take to consist of the
linguistic constructs of the systems: concepts, roles, etc. We view conceptual de-
scriptions as stand-ins for their referents. Statements about descriptions are taken
to be statements about the descriptions themselves rather than their referents, in
contrast with the usual view of statements in most KL-ONE-like languages. In such
systems the only meaningful statements involving concepts are statements about the
concepts' referents since concepts are equated with logical predicates which are inter-
preted as sets, and the only statements which can be made about a set are about its
membership. This therefore makes our task easier in the sense of ensuring soundness
and completeness since we do not have to worry about unintended or non-existent
referents.
The formal semantics are fairly straightforward. We first define the set of de-
scriptions D which is a superset of the set of concepts, relations, and others, and
then we define an intensional meaning function ti : D -+ V(D) which maps a given
description d into the universe of sets over the elements of D. Given a description d,
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the expression i(d) defines a set such that every element of the set can be viewed as
satisfying the description d since it either describes an instance or a subdescription.
In addition to the function pi, we define two additional meaning functions which
are specializations of the function pi, namely pi D -+ 2 D and pi: D -+ 2 DXD
where for every d, pc(d) = (D n 'pi(d)) and piR(d) = ((D x D) n pi(d)). The function
pic maps a description to a set of descriptions such that each description satisfies the
description d (i.e. the concept view of a description), and the function pR maps a
description onto a set of ordered pairs of descriptions representing the set of pairs of
descriptions for which the described relationship holds. These functions correspond
to the functions j4c and /p from the KL-ONE discussion, but where the KL-ONE
functions can only be meaningfully applied to some elements of the model domain,
our functions can be applied to all descriptions. It is worth noting that this system
may be overly general in its use of term V(D) as the range for our meaning function,
however it leaves room for expanding the notion of descriptions to include other
notions, including for example any arbitrary function.
3.2 Semantics of Descriptions
We first present the semantics of descriptions, then of commands, and finally the
axioms of the subsumption procedure. The notation of the following discussion as-
sumes that c represents a concept, m a generic modifier, d an element of V, and r a
two-place relation of the language. When the meaning function i' is understood the
expression dl -+ d2 abbreviates dl E pi(d 2). Furthermore, in order to avoid confusion
with other variable we will use p to abbreviate pi for remained of the chapter.
3.2.1 Concept
The semantics for the built-in concepts are as follows:
*· (top-concept)= D
* p(true) = D
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* (false) = 0
There are four constructs we can use to build complex concepts:
*· ((and cl c... c,)) = -/(cl) n ii(C) n... (cn)
* p/((or c l c2... n)) = (1) U p(c 2) U ... i(cn)
· t((not c)) = {d E D d 4 i(c)}
The last operator for constructing concept is the restr which we will discuss in a
section of its own shortly.
3.2.2 Intervals
One of the principle functions of intervals is as elements of statements and modifiers as
will be described shortly, however intervals are also descriptions in their own right and
can be satisfied by other descriptions. Since we represent numbers using LISP floats let
us define the set F of such numbers. Thus given a numeric interval i, the expression
It(i) is equal to the set of elements of F which lie within the interval described by i.
So for example /((at-least x less-than y)) = {d E F I (d > x) A (d < y)}. The meaning
of numeric intervals using other numeric-rel-op's are all very straightforward. The
meaning of intervals with unit specification is is a special case of the meaning of paired
descriptions which is as follows:
* ((dl, d2)) = {(d3,d4 ) I (d3 E pl(dl)) A (d4 E (d2))}
3.2.3 Built-in Relations
This section presents the semantics of the built-in relations. The relations that can
be used between any two descriptions are:
* (dl, d2) E gl(subsumes) iff (dl) C_ (d2)
* (dl,d 2) e Ip(instance-of) iff d E (d2).
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* (d1, d2) E I(same-as) iff p(dl) = (d2).
The following relations are intended to be used only between descriptions of certain
types:
* (ml, m 2) E (specializes) iff (ml) C u(m2).
* (C, C2 ) E yU(kind-o) iff (c1) C (C2).
* (d, m) E p(satisfies) iff d E (m).
Although the semantics of the this set of relations are identical to the semantics of
some of the semantics of relations in the preceding set, we create and encourage the
use of these two different sets of relations in order to preserve the distinction between
modifiers and concepts discussed in section 2.1.2.
3.2.4 Relation-forming Operators
The following describes the semantics of the relation forming operators:
* (d1, d 2) E u((inverse r)) iff (d2, d) E (r).
* (dl ,d 2) E ((all r)) iff {d E V I (dl, d) p (r) = p(d2).
* (do,d,) E p((chain r r2 ... rn)) iff n > 2 and 3dl,d 2,...,dn_ E D,(do ri
d1 ) A (d1 r2 d2) ... (dn- 2 rn. 1 dn-1) A (dn_ r d).
* (dl, d) E ,((constrain r d2)) iff ((d, d3) E r) A (d3 E p(d2)).
The all relation says that the second description describes the set of all descriptions
which stand in the specified relationship to the first description. The chain relation
allows one to assert that two descriptions are connected by a chain of relations and
intervening descriptions, and the constrain relations restricts the range of a relation
to only those concepts which satisfy a given description.
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3.2.5 Statements
Before we can present the semantics for several key elements of the language we need
to discuss the semantics of statements. For any given statement it must be satisfied
by only one of the built-in concepts true or false. We say that a statement s is
true (w.r.t. /u) if (s) = {true} and s is false (w.r.t. /i) if p(s) = {false}. The
simplest form of a statement is (dl r d2), and in that case ((d r d2)) = {true}
iff (d, d2) E (r), otherwise Lp((d1 r d2 )) = {false}. We will discuss shortly the
semantics of more complex statements involving quantified descriptions, but now we
present the semantics of the basic compound statements:
*· ((or s s82 . . s) = {true} iff for some i where 1 > i > n, (si) = {true}.
*· ((and sl s2 ... s,) = {true} iff for all i where 1 > i > n, p(si) = {true).
* ((not s)) = {true} iff p(s) = {false}.
3.2.6 Quantified Descriptions
In this section we will describe how the above semantics are changed by the intro-
duction of quantificational information. To do this we will need to introduce some
additional functions to explain the semantics; the basic format is as follows:
*· i(((Tag1 d) r (Tag2 d2)))={true} iff pl(Tagl,d, r, Tag2,d2).
*· ((dl r (Tag2 d2)))={true} iff l("No-Tag", dl, r, Tag2, d2).
*· U(((Tagl dl) r d2))={true} iff WOl(Tag,, dl, r, "No-Tag", d2).
The function cpl and an auxiliary function g2 are defined in the Table 3.1. Note that
in the last two entries for Y2 the tag is numeric so we require d2 to be an interval.
3.2.7 Examples
The following provides some examples of uses of the above formulas to generate the
semantics of simple statements:
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Table 3.1: Semantics of statements involving quantified descriptions.
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Expression Meaning
p1("No-Tag", d1, r, Tag2, d2) cP2(dl, r, Tag2, d2)
(p1(Some, dl, r, Tag2 , d2) d G D, (d 4 dl) A ,o2(d,r, Tag2 , d2)
cP1(Every, d1, r, Tag2, d2) Vd E D, (d - dl) -4 02 (d, r, Tag2, d2)
(P(Only, d1, r, Tag2, d2) Vd E D, p2(d, r, Tag2, d2) -+ (d - dl)
( 1(No, d1, r, Tag2, d2) Vd E D, p2(d, r, Tag2, d2) -- -(d -+ dl)
,1(One, d1 , r, Tag2, d2) 3d E D, (d -4 dl) A (p2(d, r, Tag2, d2 ) A (Vd* E D,
((d* -* dl) A p2 (d*, r, Tag2, d2)) 4 (d* = d))
Expression Meaning
cp2 (d, r, "No-Tag", d2 ) (d r d2)
02(d, r, Some, d2) (3d E D, (d 2 d2) A ((d, d) E j(r))
p2 (d, r, One, d2) (3d D, (d d2) A ((d, d E (r))A
(Vd' E vD, ((d' -+ d2) A ((d, d') E pL(r))) 4 (d' = d))
2 (d, r, Every, d2 ) (Vd E D, (d - d2 ) - ((d, d) E ,(r))
2 (d, r, Only, d2 ) (Vd E D, ((d, d) E pl(r)) - (d -÷ d2 ))
2 (d, r, No, d2) (d D, ((d, d) E d(r)) - -(d d2))
p2(d, r, Qty, d2) 3d E D, (d - d2) A ((d, d) E (r))
iP2(d, r, Num, d2) (3d 3, d4 E D d2 = (d3, d4))A
I{dE D I (d- d4 ) A (d,d) 7)r}[ E (d3)
Ex. 13 ((Every Ovary) contains (Some Egg)) is true iff:
Vd E D, (d - Ovary) -- (3d, (d - Egg) A ((d, d) E p(contains)))
Ex. 14
((Every Fetus) fed-through (One Placenta)) is true iff:
Vd E D, (d - Fetus) -+ (3d E D, (d -+ Placenta) A (d fed-through d)A
(Vd' E D,((d' -4 Placenta) A (d' 5 d)) -e
-,(d fed-through d'))
Ex. 15
((No Contraceptive) prevents (Every STD)) is true iff:
Vd e D,((Vd E D, (d + STD) -+ (d prevents d)) A (3d E D, (d -* STD)))
-+ -(d -  Contraceptive)
The concept STD abbreviates Sexually-Transmitted-Disease.
Ex. 16 (Sally eats (Only Kosher-Foods)) is true iff:
Vd E D, (Sally eats d) -- (d '- Kosher-Foods)
Ex. 17
((No Contraceptive) prevents (Only STDs)) is true iff:
Vd E D,((Vd E D2), (d prevents d) -+ (d -+, STD)) A (3d E D, (d prevents d)))
-+ -(d -+ Contraceptive)
Ex. 18
(Sally (Constrain uses Contraceptives) (Only Oral-Contraceptives)) is true iff:
Vd E D,((Sally uses d) A (d -+ Contraceptive)) -+
(d -+ Oral-Contraceptive)
Ex. 19 ((Only Men) use Condoms) is true iff:
Vd E D, (d uses Condoms) -+ (d -+ Man)
Ex. 20
(Sally (All (Constrain sexual-partner Man))
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(restr Man (rel co-worker Sally))) is true iff:
Vd E VD,((Sally, d) -sexual-partners)A (d -÷ Man)) +
((d -+ Man) A ((d, Sally) -+ co-worker)))
3.2.8 Modifiers
The construction of modifiers relies on the construction of quantified descriptions as
described in the previous sections. Recall from the previous chapter that modifiers
are intended to represent the traditional notion of a predicate and modifiers without
label statements can take one of following forms:
*· ((rel r d)) = {d I (d,d) E (r)}.
*· ((rel r (Tag d))) = {dl I P2(di, r, Tag, d)}.
*· ((pred d))= i(d).
The value of p2 is described in table 3.1. Since the use of label statements within
modifiers is only meaningful when labels appear within a restr, we discuss that case
in conjunction with the restr operator, in the next section.
3.2.9 Restriction Concepts
Recall that the restr operator returns a concept. First we present the form which does
not use labels or statements which is as follows:
* p((restr c (rel r (Tag, dl))
(rel r2 (Tag2 d 2))
(rel r, (Tag, d3)))= {d E D I (d E (c))A^p2(d, ri, Tag, dl)
AWp2 (d, r 2 , Tag, d2 )
A 2(d r, Tag, dn)}
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If every modifier is labelled and there is a statement attached to the end of the restr
operator then the semantics are listed below. In the cases in which only some modifiers
have labels or tags, the semantics can be easily determined, however describing those
cases adds still more complexity so we omit them at this point.
* ((restr c (rel rl (Tag 1 d) (label 11))
(rel r 2 (Tag 2 d2) (label 12))
(rel r (Tag, d3) (label 1))
with ((Tag di) r (Tag' d2))))=
{d E V I(dE p (c)) A 2(d,rl, Tag, d) A 2(d,r2, Tag,d 2)... A 02 (d, r, Tag,d )A
(Tag,d l ,r, Tag', d2 )[u(11)/{d I (d,d) E p(rl)},
C(12)/{d (d,d) E p(r2)},
p(l.)/I I (d, d) G (r)}]}
Although the expression above is complex consider the following example from Chap-
ter 2:
(restr student (rel favorite-professor (one Person) (label L1))
(rel taking (some class) (label L2))
with ((one L1) teaches (some L2)))
In this case we are describing a student who has exactly one favorite professor and
that professor is teaching some class that the student is taking. The crucial element of
the semantics above is the substitution of a new meaning for i and that this meaning
depends on d. Thus the concepts L1 and L2 do not have a static meaning such that
it is possible to describe (L1) or u(L2). In a sense we are using the labels to perform
a syntactic trick to get the desired semantics. Finally, note that although the tag in
front of L2 must be some, the tag in front of L1 could be either one, some, or every
since we can assume that the cardinality of u(L2) is always one.
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3.3 Semantics of Commands
In the current version of the language there are only two types of commands. Com-
mands prefixed with either def, dcl, or dcl we call assertions. The effect of assertions
is simply to add a statement to the knowledge base, and we know that for any state-
ment s, if s EKB then g(s) = {true}. Assertions also mark the statement as either
definitional, assertional, or defeasible. Unfortunately we have not developed formal
notions of how these markings would effect the semantics and thus for now they are
ignored on that level. We believe, however that allowing the user to preserve this
distinction on some level is of high importance. In place of formal notions we will
mention briefly two proposals for directions along which formal semantics might be
developed, although this certainly does not do justice to the broad body of literature
which addresses the integration of definitional, assertional, and defeasible information.
One option builds on the notion of epistemic entrenchment by suggesting that
definitional information is the very last kind of information to relax in the face of
a contradiction and brings into question the very nature of entity involved, whereas
assertional information is something that is know to be true of a given object or
category of objects but which is not central to the nature of the entity. For example,
if we made the assertion that infants do not play chess that statement would be
assertional, since if one day there was an infant born of a grand-master who could
play a brief game of chess in her third day of life that would be extraordinary but
it would not call into question whether the child was an "infant" or not. Whereas,
if woman gave birth to a fully mature adult midget we might call such a being an
"infant".
Another possible proposal is to view the difference between definitional, asser-
tional, and typical information using the notion of orders of magnitude in probability.
By that scheme we would view definitional information as facts which cannot be con-
tradicted without forcing the relevant concept to lose most of its intended meaning
(i.e. probability of a contradiction is 0), assertional information represents material
which we believe with near certainty (the sun will rise tomorrow) but for which we
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can conceive of a scenario in which it would not be true (the earth explodes) (i.e. pos-
sibility of a contradiction is very small but non-zero). Finally, typicality assertions
are ones which we can easily conceive of either being true or false (i.e. probability
order of 10-1 ) but which are more likely to be true than not true.
The last command which we need to discuss is the name command, which at first
glance seems to be very similar to the dcl, def, or typ commands. However the name
command actually has a very different use, essentially it acts as a macro by creating
a pointer to a given concept. Thus where (dcl triangle same-as (restr ...)) would
cause the system to create two new description records or structures and assert the
same-as relation between them, the command name triangle (restr ...)) creates only
one new structure which can be referenced through the name "triangle".
3.4 Rules of Subsumption
At the beginning of this chapter we introduced the notion of an inference relation
and in this section we detail the rules which form the basis of our particular inference
relation i. The format of this section will be that we will state each rule and then
immediately prove it to be sound with respect to the semantics from the preceding
sections. Most of the rules are straightforward although there are a few in which
generalizing a subexpression of a description produces a more specific description.
One piece of notation we will need is of the form ~i (d, subsumes d2 ), which indicates
that for all knowledge bases, KB -i (dl subsumes d2). In the remainder of this
discussion we will also drop the subscript from -i to avoid confusion.
3.4.1 Built-in Relations and Base Axioms
The following are the most basic rules involving the built-in subsumption relations
and the identity and transitivity rules. Note that our first rules requires no hypothesis.
(d subsumes d)
Soundness Proof: tz(d) C_ l(d) so (d subsumes d).
63
(d1 subsumes d3),(d 3 subsumes d 2)
(di subsumes d2)
Soundness Proof: We are given that (d 2) C ,u(d3) C /u(dl), so by the transi-
tivity of the subset relation /z(d2) C ,u(d1). Thus (di subsumes d2).
(m 2 specializes m1 )
(m subsumes m2 )
Soundness Proof: By definition.
(C2 kind-of c1)
(cl subsumes C2 )
Soundness Proof: By definition.
(d2 same-as dl)
(di subsumes d2)
Soundness Proof: By definition.
(di same-as d2)
(dl subsumes d2 )
Soundness Proof: By definition.
((Every d) instance-of cl)
(ci subsumes di)
Soundness Proof: The meaning of ((Every d1 ) instance-of cl) following the tables
describing the semantics of quantification tags in section 3.2.6 is Vd E D, (d -+
dl) -+ (d, cl) E (instance-of). Using the semantics of the instance-of relation
from section 3.2.3 the above implies that Vd E D, d E 1i(d1 ) -+ d E (cl). Thus
u(dl) C (C1).
((Every d) satisfies ml)
(ml subsumes dl)
Soundness Proof: Following the format of the above proof, the meaning of
((Every d) satisfies ml) from the tables is Vd E , (d -+ dl) -+ (d, ml) 
p(satisfies)). Substituting the meaning of the satisfies relation implies that
Vd E D, d E /u(dl) - d E /i(ml). Thus u(dl) C a(ml).
3.4.2 Concepts
(top-concept subsumes c)
Soundness Proof: By definition.
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(cl subsumes c), (c2 subsumes c2),... (c, subsumes c)
(and cl 2 ... Cn) subsumes (and al 2... am)
where for all i where 0 < i < n there exists some j where 0 < j < m such that
,! _ C. - CI i
Soundness Proof: If d E u((and 1 2... am)) then by definition d E p(cj) for all
j, 1 < j < m. However, for each ci there is some j such that (ci subsumes aj),
i.e. /(aj) C (ci). So since d E 1p(j) for all j it follows that d E (ci) for all
i and therefore d E ((and cl c2... c,)), hence p((and cl c2... cn)) C p((and al
C2... Cm)) -
(c' subsumes C1), (c2 subsumes c2),... (c' subsumes am)
(or c c2... Cn) subsumes (or c1 2... am)
where for all j where 0 < j < m there exists some i where 0 < i < n such that
Ctj = Ci .
Soundness Proof: If d E /l((or al 2 ... am)) then by definition there exists some
j' such that d E (Sj,). From the givens it follows that there exists some i' such
that (ci, subsumes aj,) and thus d E p(ci,). Therefore d E pi((or cl c2 ... cn), so
/i((or a1 2 ... Cm))c I((or cl c2... cn)).
(c2 subsumes cl)
(not cl) subsumes (not c2))
Soundness Proof: If d E ((not c2 )) then d /u(c2). So if /(cl) C u(c2) then we
know that d V ,(cl) and thus d e ji((not cl)) so p((not c2)) C /((not cl)).
(cl subsumes C2), (nml subsumes m, ), ( 2 subsumes m ),.. (mn subsumes m)
((restr Cl ml m 2 ... m,) subsumes (restr c2 hl1 fn2... Fnm))
where for all i where 0 < i < n there exists some j where 0 < j < m such that
m = .
Soundness Proof: If d E u((restr C2 rnl 2.. . him)) then by definition d E p.(c2 )
and d E (fhj) for all j, 1 < j < m. However, since (c1 subsumes c2),
d (cl) and for each mi there is some rmj such that (mi subsumes rhj),
i.e. ,t(rinj) C (mi). So since d E (fnj) for all j it follows that d E (mi)
for all i and therefore d E ((rest cl ml m2... mn)), hence p/((restr cl m
m2... m,)) C ,u((restr c2 ril fn2... hm)).
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3.4.3 Modifiers
(r2 subsumes rl),(dl subsumes d2 )((rel r (only dl)) subsumes (rel r2 (only d2)))
Soundness Proof: If d E p((rel r2 (only d2))) then Vd E D such that (d, d) E p(r2)
it follows by definition that d E i(d 2). Since (rl) C (r2) we know that
{d E D I (d, d) E (rl)} C {d E D I (d, d) E p(r 2 )}. Further since (dl subsumes
d2) it is clear that if d E (d2 ) then d E 1 (dl). If Vd E D s.t. (d, d) E (r2)
implies d E u(d2) then Vd E V s.t. (d, d) E (r1 ) implies d E (dl) since both
the condition and the implication are weaker in the second statement. Thus
d E ((rel rl (only dl))) and hence /((rel rl (only dl))) C _((rel r2 (only d2 ))).
(d2 subsumes dl),(rl subsumes r2 )
(rel rl (every dr)) subsumes (rel r2 (every d2 )))
Soundness Proof: If d E s((rel r2 (every d2))) then Vd E /s(d2), (d, d) E (r2)
by definition. Since (d2 subsumes dl) it follows that Vd' E 1i(d2) implies that
d' E (dl) and hence (d,d') E (r2 ). Further since (rl subsumes r2), it is
also true that (d, d') E (rl). Thus Vd' E p/(dl), (d, d') E (rl) and therefore
d E u((rel r (every d))). So ((rel r (every d))) C p(rel r2 (every d2)).
(dl subsumes d2),(rl subsumes r2 )
((rel rl (some dl)) subsumes (rel r2 (some d 2)))
Soundness Proof: If d E u((rel r2 (some d 2)) then by definition 3d E (d2) s.t.
(d,d) E l(r2 ). It is also true that d E (dl) since (d1 subsumes d 2), and that
(d,d) E (r1) since (rl subsumes r2 ). Thus 3d E ,u(di) and (d, d) E (rl) so
d E ((rel rl (some d)) and therefore ,u((rel r2 (some d2)) C ((rel r (some
dl)).
(d2 subsumes d),(r 2 subsumes r)
(rel r (no d)) subsumes (rel r2 (no d2)))
Soundness Proof: If d E ((rel r2 (no d2))) then Vd E (d2 ), (d,d) p ,(r 2). Since
(d2 subsumes dl) and (r2 subsumes rl) we know that d E (dl), (d, d) (rl).
Thus d E ((rel rl (no d))) and therefore ((rel rl (no dl))) ((rel r2 (no
d2))).
(dl subsumes d2),(rl subsumes r2)
(el rl (qty dl)) subsumes (rel r2 (qty d 2)))
Soundness Proof: If d E ((rel r2 (qty d 2))) then 3i E , where I is the set of
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interval descriptions, such that i E p(d2) and (d, i) E i(ri). Since (dl subsumes
d2) and (r1 subsumes r2) it is also true that i E /(dl) and (d, i) E /(rl). Thus
3i E I such that i E (di) and (d, i) E p(r1). Therefore, d E ((rel rl (qty dl)))
and thus u((rel r2 (qty d2 )))C ,u((rel rl (qty dl)).
(rl subsumes r2),(d 1 subsumes d2 )
((rel r (num ((at-least x1 ),dl))) subsumes (rel r 2 (num ((at-least x 2 )),d2 )))
where x < x2.
Soundness Proof: If d E pu((rel r2 (num ((at-least x2),d2 )))) then
I{d E D (d E tp(d2)) A (d, d) E t(r 2)} > 2. Since (d1 subsumes d2( and (rl
subsumes r2), {d E D I (d E (d2)) A (d,d) E (r2)} C {d E V L (d 
p(dj)) A (d,d) E (r)} and thus I{d E (d E (dl)) A (d,d) E p(rl)}l > x2 >
x1. Thus d E ((rel r (num ((at-least x1),dl)))), so /p((rel r (num ((at-least
xl),dl)))) C _/((rel r2 (num ((at-least x 2),d 2)))).
(r2 subsumes rl), (d2 subsumes dl)((rel r (num ((at-most xi),dl))) subsumes (rel r 2 (num ((at-most x 2),d2 ))))
where x1 > x2.
Soundness Proof: If d E ((rel r2 (num ((at-most x 2),d2 )))) then
I{d E D (d E (d2 )) A (d, d) (r 2 )} < 2. Since (d2 subsumes dl) and (r2
subsumes rl), {d E D (d E (dl)) A (d,d) E (ri)} C {d E I (d E
/(d 2))A (d, d) E (r2)} and thus I {d E D I (d E (d)) A (d,d) E (rl)} < 2 <
x1. Thus d GE ((rel rl ((num (at-least xi),di)))), so /u((rel r (num ((at-least
xl),di)))) C p((rel r2 (num ((at-least x2),d 2)))).
((rel r (num ((from x1 b to xl,),d))) subsumes (rel r (num ((from x2b to x2,),d))))
if xI > x2t and Xlb < 2b
Soundness Proof: If d E /,((rel r (num ((from x 2t to x 2b),d)))) then
x 2b < {d E D (d E u(d2)) A (d,d) E P(r2)} < x 2t. So clearly
xib < {d E z (d E (d 2)) A (d, d) E (r 2)} I < xit. Thus d E ((rel r (num
((from xi t to xlb),d))) and therefore p((rel r (num ((from x1t to xib),d)))) C P((rel
r (num ((from 2t to 2b),d)))).
Although there are a number of different ways to construct an interval in addition to
the ones specified above, they can be trivially reduced to one of the cases already pre-
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sented. In the language we allow the user to specify any number of numeric-rel-op's,
and we can convert the user input to a canonical form which will fall into one of three
categories: greater than x, less than x, or between two values. The other numeric
operators which we have not included above are less-than and more-than which are
the same as at-least and at-most but with < instead of < and > in place of >.
In addition to the above, there is a simply interaction between statements and
modifier. The following relationships closely parallel the subsumption of modifiers
described above and we omit most of the proofs since they are almost identical to the
proceeding set:
((every d3) r 2 (only d2)), (r2 subsumes r),(di subsumes d2)
((rel r (only dl)) subsumes d3)
Soundness Proof: If d E 1l(d3) then by the table in section 3.2.6, Vd E D such
that (d, d) E p(r 2 ) we know that d E /I(d 2). Since (rl) C_ u(r2) we know that
(d E VD (d, d) E MI(rl)} C (d E D I (d, d) E L(r2)}. Further since (dl subsumes
d2) it is clear that if d E (d2) then d E Ip(dl). If Vd E D s.t. (d, d) E (r2)
implies d E jz(d2) then Vd E V s.t. (d, d) E (rl) implies d E /(dl) since both
the condition and the implication are weaker in the second statement. Thus
d E pu((rel r (only d1))) and hence 1 (d3) C jL((rel r2 (only d2))).
((every d3 r2 (every d2 )), (d2 subsumes d),(rl subsumes 2)
((rel r (every dl)) subsumes d3 )
((every d3) r 2 (some d2)), (dl subsumes d2),(rl subsumes r2 )
((rel rl (some dl)) subsumes d3)
((every d3) r2 (no d2)),(d 2 subsumes dl),(r 2 subsumes rl)
((rel rl (no dl)) subsumes d3)
((every d3) r2 (qty d2)), (dl subsumes d2),(rl subsumes r2)
((rel r (qty dl)) subsumes d3)
{((every d3) r2 (num ((at-least x2),d2))),(rl subsumes r2 ),(dl subsumes d2)
((rel rl (num ((at-least xl),dl))) subsumes d3)
where xl < x2.
{((every d3) r2 (num ((at-most x 2),d2))), (r2 subsumes rl),(d 2 subsumes dl)
((rel rl (num ((at-most xl),dl))) subsumes d3)
where x1 > x 2.
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{((every d3) r (num ((from X2bottom to x2 o,,),d)))
((rel r (num ((from Xlbottom to xl,o,),d))) subsumes d3)
if Xl,, p> x2top and Xlbottom < X2bottom-
The final element of this discussion involves subsumption across different quantifica-
tional tags. We will state the following theorems without proof although they are all
straightforward:
(rel r (one d)) subsumes (rel r (num ((exactly 1),d)))
* (rel r (no d)) subsumes (rel r (num ((at-most O),d)))
(rel r (some d)) subsumes (rel r (every d))
(rel r (some d)) subsumes (rel r (one d))
3.4.4 Relations
(ri subsumes r 2 )((inverse rl) subsumes (inverse r2)
Soundness Proof: If (da, db) E p((inverse r 2 )) therefore (db, da) E A (r2). Hence
if (rl subsumes r 2 ) then (db,da~) E (rl) and (d,,db) E ( (inverse rl)). Thus
,i((inverse rl)) C ,((inverse r2)).
(r2 subsumes rl)((all r) subsumes (all r2))
Soundness Proof: If (d, d6) E ((all r2 )) then {d E ) I (d, d) E (r2)} C (db).
Thus if (r2 subsumes r) then {d E V I (da, d) E z(rl)} C {d E V I (d, d) E
ii(r 2)} C _/(db). Hence, (d, db) E I((all rl)) so p((all r2)) C ((all rl)).
{(r subsumes fr), (r2 subsumes 2)... (rn subsumes -)((chain r r... rn) subsumes (chain i 2... .))
Soundness Proof: If (da, db) E /i((chain r2... )) then 3d, d2,..., d, such
that (d,, dl) E ,(,l), (dl, d2) E (r2), . . , (dn, db) E i(rn). So if (ri subsumes 'i)
for 1 < i < n then (d, d) E (rl), (dl, d2) E (r2), . .,(d,, db) E ti(rn). Thus
(d,, db) / I l((chain rl r2... rn), so 1((chain r r2... rn) C p((chain rj 2 ,)).
(rl subsumes r2),(dl subsumes d2)
constrain rl d) subsumes (constrain r2 d2)
Soundness Proof: If (da,db) E 4((constrain r2 d2)) then (da,db) E i(r2) and
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db E I(d2). So if (rl subsumes r2) and (dl subsumes d2) then (d, db) E p(rl)
and db E (dl). Hence (da, db) E ((constrain rl dl)) so ((constrain rl dl)) C
p((constrain r2 d2))
3.5 Soundness and Completeness
We will now prove the soundness of our system with respect to our semantics, and
conjecture that completeness also follows. However, before we can do that we need
to state the form of a proof using the inference relation. A knowledge base consists
of a collection of statements and we define KB I- s, read as s is deducible from the
knowledge base, to be true if and only if there exists a series of statements So, sl, · ·. , ,
where s, = s, such that for each si, either si E KB, or F- si, or there exists some
inference rule R listed in section 3.4.1 to section 3.4.4 and some set {jo0, l, ... , m}
such that for all j, where 0 < j < m < i, j = sk for some k, 0 < k < i, and
{so, S,..., , Sm} FR Si.
Theorem 1 (Soundness) For any two descriptions d,d 2 and a given knowledge
base, KB, if KB - (di satisfies d2) then KB = (d1 satisfies d2).
Proof: If KB F- (d1 satisfies d2) then it follows directly from our notion of a proof using
- that the statement (d1 satisfies d2) must follow as the result of the application of a
finite number of rules using the statements in the KB. Since we have already proved
all of these rules sound with respect to the semantics, it follows that the repeated
application of these rules would also be sound.
Conjecture 1 (Completeness) For any two descriptions dl, d2 and a given knowl-
edge base, KB, if KB = (d1 satisfies d2) then KB F (dl satisfies d2).
Unfortunately, we expect a proof of completeness would be considerably more
complex than the soundness proof, and although we believe that it is provable, we
will consider the proof to be the subject of future work.
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Chapter 4
Future Work and Conclusions
Our view of Woods' technical report is that to a large degree it is an important
and careful advocacy for a different methodology in the designing of general purpose
knowledge representation systems. For example he argues at some length that previ-
ous tractability research has been using an inappropriate metric in judging KL-ONE
style systems. However, although Woods puts forward a framework for tackling a
number of issues that have bedeviled the KR community for years, the details of the
framework often are very sketchy, and Woods' contribution to some degree can be
summarized as an exhortation that the issues can in fact be successfully resolved if
the community would take a less restrictive approach. This work involves an effort
to further specify several of these important details.
To a large degree Woods' has two central claims, namely that effective KR systems
should provide:
* Quantificational tags allowing links to carry explicit quantificational informa-
tion; and
* A notion of subsumption which is based on the intensional meaning of concep-
tual structures rather than the extensional meaning which has dominated most
previous KL-ONE style systems.
This thesis took these two claims as its focus, and we summarize our conclusions
about each in turn.
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4.1 Quantificational Tags
Woods' argues that quantificational tags allow the knowledge engineer to make ex-
plicit much of the information that has been left implicit in other KL-ONE style
systems and keeping this information implicit causes significant confusion both for
the engineer and for the end user. The classic example from Woods' 1975 paper [29]
of a link connecting the concepts black and telephone provides a key illustration of
the need for explicit quantificational information. Among the possible meanings of
the link between the concepts black and telephone are: that all telephones must be
black, that there exists at least one telephone which is black, that there exists only
one black telephone, that every black thing is a telephone, or that some black thing
is a telephone.
Although Woods' 1975 criticisms in [29] were taken to heart by people in the
semantic nets community, who then worked harder to better define the semantics of
their links, a single choice of meanings from the above list in all cases still is not
adequate and in practice the user needs to be able to specify explicitly which one of
the above meanings fits each particular case. The syntax and semantics put forth by
Woods in [31] provides a moderately concrete mechanism for allowing this.
Our contribution in this area has been to incorporate Woods' tagging system into
a larger framework. We have generalized Woods' tags somewhat by incorporating
several additional tags and combinations of tags beyond those mentioned by Woods,
and we have developed a syntax we believe will be more straightforward and intuitive
to the naive reader. In addition we have used the framework of quantificational tags
to provide a natural way for having a numerical value or interval be the object of a
link, an important extension in light of previous work representing medical knowledge
which demonstrated the critical role of the ability to reason with numerical values as
the object of a given relation.
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4.2 Intensional Foundations
The focus which Woods brings to an intensional rather than extensional semantics
is in many ways the most important foundational issue that he raises. In exten-
sional subsumption one concept is considered to subsume another if and only if every
thing which satisfies the latter concept also satisfies the former concept. Although
extensional subsumption has generally been accepted without much debate for most
KL-ONE-like systems, this form of subsumption has two major drawbacks. The first
has to do with the computational complexity. For example, in an extensional system
one is required to determine that the concept of a language determined by a con-
text free grammar and the concept of a language accepted by a pushdown automata
subsume each other, presuming that these concepts could even be represented. The
burden of recognizing such coincidences is very significant for the inferential mecha-
nism. In fact, it turns out that subsumption even in fairly restricted languages is often
intractable if not undecidable. The other major problem with extensional subsump-
tion is that it violates some fundamental intuitions regarding identifying concepts
with empty extensions (e.g. unicorns, 150 year old men, etc.).
In response Woods argues that this notion of subsumption is in reality a confla-
tion of five distinct senses of subsumption and that rather than making extension
subsumption the basis for an inference system that in its place we should substitute
structural subsumption in which, "the subsuming concept is determined to be more
general than the subsumed concept by virtue of the formally specified subsumption
criterion applied to the structure of the descriptions - preferably by an algorithm that
is computational tractable or at least more efficient than general deduction." In ad-
dition Woods suggests that it should be possible to make statements about concepts
themselves rather than being required to only refer to their extensions, and hence this
allows one to in some ways view a concept both as an "individual" and a "class".
Unfortunately, Woods did not discuss how to set up the semantics underneath
this new notion of a conceptual description nor did he describe what exactly would
be the formal notion of subsumption, and it is the task of filling in those foundations
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that is the core contribution of this work. We describe how to create and structure
the domain of conceptual descriptions over which the system reasons and how to
assign meaning the various language constructs in order to allow statements to be
made about concepts themselves rather than their referents. Furthermore, we specify
the details of an inference relation to determine subsumption relationships which is
sound with respect to our semantics and we believe also complete, although that is
the subject of future work.
Another item for future work is that Woods' suggests that one might want the
option to have a concept be satisfied in a given situation as a notion of satisfaction with
regard to conceptual descriptions that goes beyond the standard predicate calculus
notion of a concept being satisfied by some entity. Our notion of contexts opens the
possibility of providing for concepts which are satisfied only within certain contexts,
but in this work we really only deal with the notion of a concept being satisfied by a
given entity.
4.3 Conclusion
In summary this thesis provides further development along one of the more promising
lines of general purpose knowledge representation research. In the early days of
semantics networks, it was possible to represent a large variety of concepts but because
of the absence of explicit semantics even the authors of such systems were sometimes
contradictory or easily confused in their usage, and different users would inevitably
interpret the structures differently from how the designers had intended. As a result
the field moved sharply in the direction of systems with very precise, rigid semantics
based on first order logic and adopted a set of goals (soundness and completeness)
which so drastically curtailed expressivity that most real world knowledge fell notable
out of reach of these limited system.
In his work, Woods advocates abandoning some of the more rigid requirements of
the KRYPTON generation (e.g. completeness) and distances himself from the notion of
a concept as a first order predicate. He also advances the idea of intensional subsump-
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tion as a way to deal with a number of difficult computation issues while providing
a more intuitive basis for subsumption, and presents the idea of quantificational tags
as a means to enhance expressivity and deal with a significant source of past confu-
sion. In this thesis, we take Woods' sketch as a starting point and construct a KR
language with a fully specified set of syntax and semantics. Most importantly, we
take Woods' notions of "conceptual descriptions" and "satisfaction" and provide a
firm set of formal foundations which are congruent to the demands of the remained
Woods' framework.
Clearly this work represents an intermediate step in the path to more powerful and
useful knowledge representation systems, however given the history of KR it seems
that considerable investments of time and effort into the design of the foundations of
the central representational constructs is essential to being able to make important
distinction later down the line. We are optimistic that future real-world applications
we be able to rest solidly on the foundations advance here.
75
76
Bibliography
[1] C. Alchourr6n, P. G/rdenfors, and D. Makinson. On the logic of theory change:
Partial meet contraction functions and their associated revision functions. Jour-
nal of Symbolic Logic, 50:510-530, 1985.
[2] Kenneth L. Becker, editor. Principles and Practice of Endocrinology and
Metabolism. J.B. Lippincott Company, Grand Rapids, 1990.
[3] Ronald J. Brachman, Richard E. Fikes, and Hector J. Levesque. Krypton: A
functional approach to knowledge representation. Computer, 16(10):67-73, 1983.
[4] Ronald J. Brachman, Richard E. Fikes, and Hector J. Levesque. KRYPTON: a
functional approach to knowledge representation. In Ronald J. Brachman and
Hector J. Levesque, editors, Readings in Knowledge Representation, chapter 6,
pages 411-429. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc., Los Altos, California, 1985.
[5] Ronald J. Brachman and James G. Schmolze. An overview of the KL-ONE knowl-
edge representation system. Cognitive Science, 9:171-216, 1985.
[6] Jon Doyle and Ramesh S. Patil. Two theses of knowledge representation: Lan-
guage restrictions, taxonomic classification, and the utility of representation ser-
vices. Artificial Intelligence, 48(3):261-297, April 1991.
[7] Ira J. Haimowitz. Using NIKL in a large medical knowledge base. TM 348,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Laboratory for Computer Science, 545
Technology Square, Cambridge, MA, 02139, January 1988.
77
[8] Ira J. Haimowitz, Ramesh S. Patil, and Peter Szolovits. Representing medical
knowledge in a terminological language is difficult. In Symposium on Computer
Applications in Medical Care, pages 101-105, 1988.
[9] Graeme J. Hirst. Ontological assumptions in knowledge representation. In
Ronald J. Brachman, Hector J. Levesque, and Raymond Reiter, editors, First In-
ternation Conference on Principle of Knowledge Representation, pages 157-169,
San Mateo, 1989. Morgan Kaufmann, Inc.
[10] Thomas S. Kaczmarek, Raymond Bates, and Gabriel Robins. Recent develop-
ments in NIKL. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, pages 978-985. American Association for Artificial Intelligence, 1986.
[11] Hector J. Levesque and Ronald J. Brachman. A fundamental tradeoff in knowl-
edge representation and reasoning (revised version). In Ronald J. Brachman and
Hector J. Levesque, editors, Readings in Knowledge Representation, pages 41-70.
Morgan Kaufmann, 1985.
[12] Hector J. Levesque and Ronald J. Brachman. Expressiveness and tractability
in knowledge representation and reasoning. Computational Intelligence, 3:78-93,
1987.
[13] R.M. MacGregor. The evolving technology of classification-based knowledge
representations systems. In John Sowa, editor, Principles of semantics networks:
explorations in the representation of knowledge. Morgan Kaufmann, 1991.
[14] Johanna D. Moore. NIKL workshop summary, 15-16 July 1986. Summary of
topics discussed at the meeting among NIKL users and researchers, held at MIT,
September 1986.
[15] M. G. Moser. An overview of NIKL, the New Implementation of KL-ONE.
Technical Report 5421, Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc., 1983.
[16] Bernhard Nebel. Computational complexity of terminological reasoning in BACK.
Artificial Intelligence, 34:371-383, 1988.
78
[17] Bernhard Nebel. Terminological reasoning is inherently intractable. Artificial
Intelligence, 43(2):235-249, May 1989.
[18] Bernhard Nebel. Terminological cycles: Semantics and computational proper-
ties. In John Sowa, editor, Principles of semantics networks: explorations in the
representation of knowledge. Morgan Kaufmann, 1991.
[19] Peter Patel-Schneider. Undecidability of subsumption in NIKL. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 39(2):263-272, April 1989.
[20] R. S. Patil, P. Szolovits, and W. B. Schwartz. Information acquisition in diag-
nosis. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages
345-348. American Association for Artificial Intelligence, 1982.
[21] Gabriel Robins. The NIKL manual. Technical report (draft), The Knowledge
Representation Project, Information Sciences Institute, 4676 Admiralty Way,
Marina del Rey, California 90291, 1986.
[22] Burton D. Rose. Clinical Physiology of Acid-Base and Electrolyte Disorders.
McGraw-Hill Information Services Company, New York, 1989.
[23] Manfred Schmidt-Schauss. Subsumption in KL-ONE undecidable. In Ronald J.
Brachman, Hector J. Levesque, and Raymond Reiter, editors, Proceedings of the
First International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and
Reasoning (KR'89), pages 421-431, Toronto, Ontario, 1989.
[24] James G. Schmolze and Thomas A. Lipkis. Classification in the KL-ONE knowl-
edge representation system. In Proceedings of the Eighth International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 330-332, 1983.
[25] James G. Schmolze and William S. Mark. The nikl expeperience. Computational
Intelligence, 7(1):48=69, February 1991.
[26] Brian C. Smith. Reflection and semantics in a procedural language. TR
MIT/LCS/TR-272, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Laboratory for Com-
puter Science, 545 Technology Square, Cambridge, MA, 02139, 1982.
79
[27] Stephen W. Smoliar and William Swartout. A report from the frontiers of knowl-
edge representation. Technical Report ISI/RR-90-283, USC Information Sciences
Institute, 4676 Admiralty Way, Marina del Rey, California 90291, 1990.
[28] Marc B. Vilain. The restricted language architecture of a hybrid representation
system. In Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 547-551, 1985.
[29] William A. Woods. What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In
Bobrow and Collins, editors, Representation and Understanding, pages 35-82.
Academic Press, New York, 1975.
[30] William A. Woods. Important issues in knowledge representation. In Proceedings
of the IEEE Vol-74, 1986.
[31] William A. Woods. Understanding subsumption and taxonomy: A framework
for progress. Technical Report TR-19-90, Center for Research in Computing
Technology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, 1990. Also appears in
Principles of Semantic Networks, edited by John F. Sowa.
80
